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My dissertation focuses on issues related to the resiliency of urban infrastruc-
ture and public systems. In the first chapter, I examine the e↵ect of the financial
condition of local governments on housing values and depreciation of the U.S. housing
stock. Housing values bear the burden of municipal fiscal stress reflecting prospective
and current homeowners reduced willingness-to-pay for housing. Using panel data
from the American Housing Survey from 1984 to 2011, I estimate linear, quantile,
and semiparametric varying coe cient (VC) models to examine these e↵ects. The
findings from the linear and quantile estimation are compared to the estimation of
the VC models, which allow for a nonparametric, smoothed specification of building
age.
The results suggest that aspects of municipal solvency have di↵erential e↵ects
across the distribution of housing values and building age. New, lower priced houses
see the largest increases in housing values from larger cash and long-run solvency
ratios, which reflect greater spending on infrastructure and other long-run capital
investment projects, whereas older, lower priced houses benefit from increases in
service-level solvency, suggestive of greater spending on public amenities. Moreover,
the results indicate that the housing stock depreciates more slowly in municipali-
ties with larger values of revenue and expenditure per capita, with implied annual
depreciation rates ranging from over 0.4 to 0.7 percent.
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The second chapter examines the performance of U.S. municipal governments
prior to, during, and following the financial crisis over the period 1997–2012. Fully
nonparametric methods are employed to estimate technical e ciencies of cities, both
over time and by U.S. Census Region, utilizing recently-developed statistical results.
The results strongly suggest non-convexity of the local governments’ production set,
calling into question the results of previous studies examining municipal e ciency.
Furthermore, the results suggest that mean e ciency and productivity declined in
several U.S. regions during the financial crisis, and in some instances have not returned
to their pre-crisis level.
Finally, in the third chapter, I look at the impact of a regulation change in
San Francisco restricting owner move-in (OMI) evictions. In the 1990s, San Francisco
saw a large number of OMI evictions, a no-fault eviction frequently used by landlords
to remove units from the rent-controlled market. To prevent landlords from further
exploiting the use of OMI evictions, San Francisco passed Proposition G in 1998. This
regulation imposed higher costs on landlords utilizing this eviction type by restricting
the usage of OMI evictions in San Francisco rent-controlled buildings. My identifica-
tion strategy is supported by the use of a stochastic rent frontier which allows me to
obtain a measure of housing quality that is a linear function of observables, thereby
capturing the causal impact of the regulation on housing quality and allowing me to
observe trends in tenant filtering.
Using household-level renter data from the American Housing Survey, my re-
sults indicate that following Proposition G, rent-controlled units in San Francisco saw
lower housing quality. Additionally, I find that this result holds even after controlling
for the presence of an on-site building owner. These findings are likely driven by lower
levels of building maintenance and upkeep, reflecting the higher costs resulting from
Proposition G. These findings suggest that while this regulation intended to preserve
iii
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Chapter 1
The Capitalization of the “Shadow
Mortgage” and its Implication for
Housing Values and Depreciation
1.1 Introduction
Investment in real estate is critical to local governments as many rely on
property taxes as a main source of revenue. It is in the best interest of both local
governments and homeowners to promote and sustain a thriving real estate market.
Since housing is both a consumption and an investment good, households may pur-
chase real estate for di↵erent reasons. When deciding to buy, the decision of where
to purchase or invest in real estate can be an important one. One may consider the
size and attributes of the unit, as well as its location, which reflect the neighborhood
characteristics and amenities of the surrounding area such as school quality, access to
parks and recreation, and public infrastructure. While the characteristics of the home
may be readily apparent, it may be more di cult to assess the financial condition of
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a city or county. Municipal financial health directly a↵ects the provision of amenities
and ultimately impact one’s investment over time.
Using a traditional hedonic approach, the willingness-to-pay for certain loca-
tion amenities such as environmental quality and school quality has been investigated
in prior studies. I assert that the financial state of a municipality directly impacts
the provision and quality of public goods and services. When a municipality is under
fiscal stress, it may decrease the provision or quality of these amenities, resulting in
reduced willingness-to-pay for housing. This fiscal stress may also impact the rate
of depreciation of the housing stock, thereby eroding households’ returns on invest-
ment, an issue which has not yet been addressed in the literature. These issues are of
increasing importance with numerous municipalities filing for Chapter 9 bankruptcy
in recent years including Vallejo, California (CA) in 2008; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
in 2011; Je↵erson County, Alabama in 2011; Stockton, CA in 2012; San Bernardino,
CA in 2012; Detroit, Michigan in 2013; and Hillview, Kentucky in 2015.
In this paper I investigate the capitalization of municipal fiscal stress in housing
values and its impact on depreciation. This capitalization amounts to an additional
shadow mortgage on housing. Using panel data from 1984 to 2011, I estimate linear
and quantile regression hedonic pricing models, as well as semiparametric varying
coe cient (VC) models, for a large and representative sample of owner and renter-
occupied properties. While there are di↵erent approaches in the literature as to how
to predict fiscal stress, I use widely accepted measures of municipal solvency including
cash, budgetary, service-level, and long-run.
My findings provide evidence for the shadow mortgage and highlight the dif-
ferential impact of municipal solvency aspects on housing values. Notably, increases
in both cash and long-run solvency measures, suggesting a less financially stable gov-
ernment, negatively impact low-value properties. I find that a ten percent increase in
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total expenditure per capita leads to an approximate 0.6 percent increase in housing
values at the 0.1 quantile, around $400. By contrast, at the 0.9 quantile, this results
in almost a one percent decrease, over $3,500. Unsurprisingly, higher taxes per capita
negatively impact homeowners across the distribution. The ability of a local govern-
ment to balance its budget is positively valued by homeowners across the distribution
of housing values. At the 0.5 quantile, a ten percent increase in total revenue to
total expenditure results in a $1,400 increase in housing values. After accounting for
di↵erent aspects of municipal solvency, I find that depreciation is lower in areas with
higher levels of per capita spending on amenities compared to areas with larger cash
or other long-run solvency measures.
The decision to rent or buy a home likely depends on many factors includ-
ing household income and preferences. Henderson and Ioannides (1986) find that
consumers tend to smooth consumption over time, suggesting households that ex-
pect lower income in the future (e.g. retirement) are more likely to purchase a home
rather than rent. In addition to considering attributes of the home such as number
of rooms and floor area, prospective homeowners may also value things such as low
crime rates or high school quality. Pope and Pope (2012) investigate the impact of
crime on housing values and find that it has a significant and negative e↵ect, reflecting
homeowners’ willingness-to-avoid. Brasington and Hite (2005) estimate the demand
for environmental quality and show that environmental quality and school quality
are complement goods, as indicated by a positive cross-elasticity, whereas environ-
mental quality and house size are substitutes. Current and prospective homeowners
are responsive to changes in school quality. Hayes and Taylor (1996) find that while
location is usually the main driver in residential housing prices, school quality also
plays a significant role. Moreover, findings from Thompson (2016) show a decline in
housing prices in response to a school district being labeled as fiscally stressed.
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Local governments may take on debt by issuing bonds to fund public goods
and services such as public works projects or other capital outlays. Bronshtein (2017)
finds that governments that expect an increase in the local housing tax base may be
more likely to take on debt which was evident in the last recession. This can have
negative implications for homeowners with results from MacKay (2014) suggesting
an overcapitalization of fiscal debt in home prices. Contributing to municipal debt
concerns are rising unfunded pension obligations. Arnott and Meulbroek (2018) dis-
cuss the potential impacts of unfunded municipal pension debt and assert that since
homes are fixed assets, homeowners will bear the full burden of these obligations over
time through lower housing prices. Brinkman et al. (2016) examine determinants of
municipal pension funding and find that pension funding choices are fully capitalized
in land prices.
In addition to housing and location characteristics, prospective and current
homeowners may consider the depreciation rate of housing since it is likely to impact
their investment over time. Hulten and Wyko↵ (1980) define economic depreciation
as the “decline in asset price (or shadow price) due to aging.” Malpezzi et al. (1987)
cite this definition in their estimation of depreciation at the metropolitan statistical
area (MSA) level. Leigh (1980) estimates depreciation of the national housing stock
to be between 0.2 and 0.4 percent annually. Palmquist (1979) finds that owner-
occupied residences depreciate at around 0.8 percent annually, while Randolph (1988)
estimates annual depreciation of 0.6 percent for renter-occupied properties, although
he notes that it is not possible to identify depreciation without assuming away vintage
e↵ects, or obsolescence of the housing unit over time. Knight and Sirmans (1996) and
Wilhelmsson (2008) show that houses with lower levels of maintenance expenditures
tend to depreciate faster than those that are relatively more maintained. Francke and
van de Minne (2017) find that after 50 years of no maintenance, a structure loses 43
4
percent of its value on average. For single-family homes, results from Harding et al.
(2007) suggest homeowners see little economic gain after controlling for maintenance
and home improvements.
Walters (2009) examines whether depreciation rates di↵er between subsidized
and unsubsidized units. He expects subsidized units to depreciate more quickly since
their rent only depends on meeting minimum quality standards, but finds no evidence
to suggest a significant di↵erence between the two groups. Galbraith (1998) examines
filtering as a low-income housing policy and notes that while overall consumption
of housing has increased over time, the changes were larger for relatively wealthier
households. The location choice of low and high-income households may help to
explain this finding. It could be that wealthier households are attracted to amenities,
both built and natural, in the city center. Brueckner et al. (1999) argue that this
could lead to a Paris-style location pattern with wealthier households concentrating
in the city center and households with relatively less means populating the outer
arrondissements. Alternatively, the age of the housing stock may explain where high
and low-income households choose to live. Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009) find that
high-income households tend to locate in areas with a relatively young housing stock.
These findings lend support to the idea of downward filtering, or housing trickling
down from the wealthiest households to the poorest, until the lowest quality housing
drops out of the stock.
The impact of the shadow mortgage on housing values and investment moti-
vates the research question. To my knowledge, no previous studies have empirically
analyzed this question using the framework and methodology proposed here. More-
over, the impact of local government fiscal stress on the housing stock is increasingly
important in the post-recession climate. This paper expands on the existing literature
by examining the di↵erential e↵ect of aspects of the municipal financial condition on
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housing values and also provides a framework to account for its impact on deprecia-
tion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I present a
simple theoretical model of bid rent and housing value. I develop the statistical
model in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4, I describe the data and provide summary
statistics. The empirical findings are presented in Section 1.5. In Section 1.6, I
conclude and summarize the results of the paper as well as describe additional findings
and robustness checks.
1.2 Theoretical Model
I start with a simple theoretical model, adapting from the framework of Rosen
(1974) and Hayes and Taylor (1996). I assume that consumers are rational and
attempt to maximize their utility, taking the housing stock as given. Consumers earn
income y and derive utility from consumption of z, a vector of housing characteristics
with prices p, and x, a composite good. Consumers attempt to maximize utility
U = U(x, z1, z2, . . . , zn) (2.1)
subject to their budget constraint
y = x+ p1z1 + p2z2 + . . .+ pnzn, (2.2)
where x is the numeraire good. Therefore, the consumer maximization problem is















   pi = 0 (2.5)
for the ith housing characteristic, i = 1, . . . , n. From (2.4) and (2.5), it can be shown





The demand equations for x⇤ and z⇤i , i = 1, . . . , n, can be obtained from (2.6).
Following Henderson (1977), after substituting the demand equations into the utility
function, the consumer’s indirect utility function is
U⇤(y  R, z1, z2, . . . , zn) (2.7)
where R represents total expenditures on housing services. The consumer’s bid rent
function is therefore consumer’s willingness-to-pay for values of z at a given level of
U⇤ and y. After taking the inverse of (2.7), it can be shown that the consumer’s bid
rent function is
R = R(z1, z2, . . . , zn | y, U⇤) (2.8)
where U⇤ is the level of indirect utility from (2.7). To estimate a consumer’s willingness-
to-pay for certain characteristics, partial derivatives of the bid rent function with
respect to characteristic zi can be taken.
The present value of housing services, V , to a potential homebuyer is the
discounted sum of after-tax bid rents. Letting ⌧ be the tax rate, i the discount rate,
7












In equilibrium, the value of housing services equals the highest bid o↵ered by poten-
tial consumers. To model the value of housing services, a hedonic pricing function
can be estimated containing all characteristics of housing services conferred including
observable unit attributes, as well as neighborhood and location amenities such as
high-quality schools, highways, and public parks. I posit the revenues and expendi-
tures of municipalities directly fund these public goods and services and the financial
state can impact the provision and quality of these goods.
1.3 Statistical Model
The value of housing services is a function of housing and location specific
characteristics. To estimate the marginal e↵ect of each attribute on the response
variable, I construct a hedonic model consistent with the proposed theoretical model.
Since there is not a renter-equivalent measure of housing value in the data, I specify
and estimate a hedonic pricing model for the owner and renter samples separately.
My identification strategy consists of two key assumptions: the existence of a na-
tional housing market and that the municipal solvency measures accurately reflect
the amount and quality of publicly provided amenities. The first assumption is sup-
ported by Linneman (1980) who finds that tests of the national housing market hy-
potheses cannot be rejected. Previous studies have utilized this assumption including
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Chay and Greenstone (2005) who examine the capitalization of air quality in housing
values. Identification of the municipal financial state comes through a broad set of
observations, with a wide range of solvency measures and fiscal conditions.
Typically, the coe cient on the building age term of the hedonic pricing func-
tion is used to estimate depreciation, although this may be misleading if there are
nonlinear or interaction e↵ects. To account for these possibilities, I specify an age
function
h(Ait, Di, Fit, Sct) =
10X
k=1
 kaitIk(↵k 1 < ait  ↵k) +  11aitDi +  12aitFit +  13aitSct,
(3.11)
where Ait is a vector of interactions between the building age of household i at time
t, ait, and building age group indicators Ik following Yoshida (2016), such that ↵k 1
and ↵k represent the lower and upper bounds on each age group, respectively. The
vector Sct includes the solvency measures for county c at time t, Di is an indicator
for detached housing units, and Fit is the floor area in square feet. The age function
specification allows depreciation to vary over the life of the structure and also with
structure type, floor area, and the municipal financial condition.
To capture the age profile of housing and any potential nonlinear e↵ects, I
discretize the first building age term appearing in (3.11). I include an indicator for
detached structures since it is likely that they depreciate more slowly than other types
of structures. Randolph (1988) notes that the building age interaction with structure
type is especially important because the economics and technology of maintenance
behavior is likely to vary across building types. Similarly, depreciation is likely to vary
with house size, or floor area, since larger structures tend to be located farther away
from the city center where land prices are relatively cheaper. Finally, the interaction
between building age and the solvency measure is justified by Breger (1967) who states
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that depreciation of property may result from either deterioration of the capacity to
render service or a decline in the demand for the service rendered.
For the owner-occupied specification, the complete reduced-form hedonic pric-
ing model is
lnVit = ↵0 + h(Ait, Di, Fit, Sct) +Xit 1 + Zit 2 + Sct 3 + ✏it, (3.12)
where lnVit is the log of the self-reported housing value for household i at time t. While
it is possible that homeowners may not precisely report the value of their home, results
from Robins and West (1977) reveal precision between homeowners’ self-reported and
appraised values. Kiel and Zabel (1999) further find that self-reported measures tend
to yield reliable estimates, noting that there is no systematic evidence to suggest
certain groups of homeowners more accurately assess home value than others. The
vector Xit contains observable unit characteristics and household demographics such
as the number of rooms, bathrooms, and household size, Zit contains community con-
trols and geographic information including the zone-level average household income
and education, and Sct includes the municipal financial state of county c at time t
as defined by the cash, budgetary, service, and long-run solvency measures. Since
the dependent variable is an individual measure of housing value, as opposed to an
aggregate measure, concerns over simultaneity can be avoided.
All solvency measures are for the prior fiscal year since I expect there to
be a lag e↵ect in terms of the provision of amenities and services. In this model
specification, the marginal e↵ect of the solvency measure on the response variable is
a linear function of building age. To obtain a measure of depreciation, I estimate the
marginal e↵ect
@ln(Vit)
@h(Ait, Di, Fit, Sct)




of building age on housing values evaluated at di↵erent percentiles of the solvency
measures. As homes age, their value typically decreases over time, although Chinloy
(1978) notes that theoretically there is no reason for the depreciation function to be
downward sloping.
In addition to the estimation of (3.12), a similar model, i.e.,
lnRit =  0 + g(Ait, Di, Fit, Sct) +X
⇤
it 1 + Zit 2 + Sct 3 + "it, (3.14)
is estimated for the renter-occupied sample where lnRit is the log of the annual
contract rent of household i at time t. The age function g(Ait, Di, Fit, Sct) is similar
to the one for owner-occupiers in (3.11). The baseline model for both the owner and
renter sample includes the full set of controls, age function, as well as location and
year fixed e↵ects, but excludes any of the municipal solvency terms or interactions
with these measures.1
I estimate (3.12) and (3.14) using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and quan-
tile regression. The estimation of the hedonic pricing model via OLS can be severely
distorted by outlier observations making quantile regression an attractive approach.
Furthermore, it is likely that the marginal e↵ect of municipal solvency di↵ers across
the distribution of housing values. Zietz et al. (2008) use quantile regression to esti-
mate a hedonic pricing model to examine the willingness-to-pay for certain housing
characteristics. They find that owners of relatively higher-priced homes value cer-
tain characteristics such as square footage and number of bathrooms di↵erently than
lower priced ones. They also note that the distribution of age also varies across the
di↵erent quantiles examined. Zahirovic-Herbert and Chatterjee (2012) find that his-
1It should be noted that annual property taxes and maintenance costs are omitted from the
renter sample estimation since there is no renter equivalent in the data. This is reflected in X⇤it and
is discussed in section 1.4.
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toric preservation tends to positively impact relatively low-price houses, but the act
of preservation may displace low-income residents, leading to a quasi-gentrification
e↵ect. By contrast, Zhang (2016) finds that lower valued homes bear more of the
negative impact following a major flood.
The quantile regression model for the owner sample, Q, due to Koenker and
following Greene (2000) can be written as
Q(V | Z, q) = Z0 q such that Pr(V  Z0 q | Z) = q, 0 < q < 1, (3.15)
where V represents the log of housing value, vector Z includes the right-hand side of
(3.12) and q represents a given quantile strictly between 0 and 1. Since no assumption
is made about the distribution of V | Z or about its conditional variance, this is
essentially a semiparametric specification. The estimator, bq of  q for a specific
quantile is computed by minimizing the function
Fn( q | V,Z) =
nX
i:Vi Z0i q
q | Vi   Zi0 q | +
nX
i:Vi<Z0i q




g(Vi   Z0i q | q)




qei,q if ei,q   0
(1  q)ei,q if ei,q < 0,
(3.16)
and ei,q = Vi  Z0i q.2 To make inference, I bootstrap and cluster the standard errors
at the county-level. All models are estimated at the 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9
2The quantile regression model for the owner-occupied sample in (3.15)–(3.16) can be easily be
modified for the renter sample. The separate appendix can be requested for results from the renter
sample estimation.
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quantiles of housing values.
Since I expect the e↵ect of the solvency measures on housing values to vary
with building age, I estimate a semiparametric VC model due to Hastie and Tibshi-
rani (1993) as a robustness check for my hedonic pricing models. It is similar to a
general additive model in that a single term enters the function nonparametrically,
although VC models permit an interaction between nonparametric and parametric
terms. This approach o↵ers several advantages over a standard parametric framework.
Specifically, these models relax the assumption of linearity between the predictors and
response variables. Wan et al. (2017) apply the VC modeling framework to the esti-
mation of hedonic house prices functions in Hong Kong. They note that VC models
reduce modeling bias and also avoid the curse of dimensionality, both advantages over
the traditional parametric model.
The VC model specification replaces the parametric building age terms in
(3.11) with smoothed nonparametric versions. The modified building age function
for the owner-occupied sample can be represented as
eh(ait, Di, Fit, Sct) = f1(ait) + f2(ait)Di + f3(ait)Fit + f4(ait)Sct, (3.17)
where fj(ait) are the smooth building age functions, j = 1, . . . , 4. The modified
building age function eg(ait, Di, Fit, Sct) for the renter sample is similar to (3.17). I
adapt (3.12) and (3.14) with the modified building age functions for the owner and
renter sample estimation, respectively.
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1.4 Data
Data used for estimation are obtained from the American Housing Survey
(AHS), U.S. Census of Governments, U.S. Census Bureau, and Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The primary source of data is the AHS. The AHS includes both
a national survey and metropolitan survey, with observations in the metropolitan
sample being tracked over time. I use the metropolitan sample data which allow
me to identify the household county. Unfortunately, not every county is sampled in
every survey and therefore the number of years between observations is nonconstant.
AHS data include characteristics of the housing unit as well as its occupants and
neighborhood. To maximize the number of repeat observations, I use data from 1984
to 2011, a period of 27 years.
Following Rosen (1974), I control for all observable characteristics of the unit,
household, and surrounding area which may a↵ect the owner’s self-reported value of
their home or the annual contract rent that a tenant pays. This includes the number
of rooms, number of bathrooms, the floor area of the unit, whether it is a detached
or multiunit building, the presence of a working fireplace, and whether it includes
a balcony or porch. Since certain features may be more desirable depending on the
where the unit is located and furthermore, since there is large regional variation
in my sample, I include several interaction e↵ects to account for di↵erences in the
inherent value of amenities following Tsoodle and Turner (2008). These include:
air conditioning (ac) ⇥ hot, fireplace ⇥ cold, and parking ⇥ cold where cold and
hot are average temperature indicator variables following the AHS definition, ac is
an indicator if the unit has central air conditioning, parking is an indicator for the
presence of covered parking, and fireplace is an indicator for the existence of a working
fireplace. It is plausible that households in areas with colder climates may value
14
attributes such as a fireplace or covered parking more compared to those living in
more temperate climates.
To account for variation in the heads of household, I utilize observable charac-
teristics that I expect will influence the self-reported property value including whether
the head of household is male, married, college-educated, and older than 65 years.
Additionally, I control for household income and di↵erences in observable housing
quality. These include indicators for whether the unit has a missing roof, missing
walls, broken windows, window bars, whether there have been leaks from the inside
or outside in the past 30 days, whether the unit has cracks, and whether there is
broken plaster. It should be noted that the wording of the AHS questions changed
slightly after 1993 with a new survey format, although it is unlikely to have a sig-
nificant impact on the results.3 I also include self-reported measures of satisfaction
with the unit and surrounding neighborhood which is included in the AHS. The ques-
tion asks “On a scale from 1–10, how satisfied are you with the housing unit?” and
similarly for the surrounding neighborhood.
In addition to the quality and satisfaction measures, I also include costs of
annual routine maintenance and annual property taxes. Harding et al. (2000) find
evidence that suggests homeowners may undermaintain housing if borrowers have
limited liability in the case of mortgage default. Unfortunately, there are not equiva-
lent survey questions for renters in the AHS data, and therefore I cannot control for
these in the renter model specification. Besides maintenance and property taxes, I
control for various geographic attributes, including the zone-level average household
size to account for di↵erences between suburban and urban areas.4 I expect that
larger households will tend to live in more suburban areas. I also include the average
3See the AHS codebook for further details.
4The AHS defines a zone as an economically homogenenous area with a population of 100,000 or
more.
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number of rooms, average household income, the fraction of black households, the
fraction of households with a college education, and average building age, all at the
zone-level, to capture neighborhood e↵ects.
For the renter sample estimation I exclude all subsidized units (including gov-
ernment owned housing projects or rent-controlled units). These types of properties
do not reflect the true market rent and hence, should not be impacted by the “shadow
mortgage.” I only consider occupied units in both the owner and renter samples. The
justification for including both owner and renter-occupied units in this analysis is two-
fold. Tiebout (1956) states that in regards to location decisions, people vote with their
feet, although this e↵ect will not likely be immediate. I include the renter-occupied
specification since I expect that the decline in the willingness-to-pay for rental units
should similarly be impacted by signs of fiscal stress.
In addition to the housing data from the AHS, I utilize data from the U.S.
Census of Governments Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances.
This is an annual survey which assesses the financial state of governments across all
levels, although not every government and government type is sampled in each sur-
vey.5 I construct the solvency ratios using data from this survey. To obtain a wide
and comprehensive assessment of municipal fiscal health, I employ several di↵erent
measures. Following the literature, I use measures of cash, budgetary, service-level,
and long-run solvency presented in Table 1.3 following Wang et al. (2007) and later
utilized by Anders and Gearhart (2018). These ratios capture the municipal finan-
cial condition and can be useful in predicting fiscal stress. Gorina et al. (2018) find
that the financial variables most associated with municipal bankruptcies are cash
solvency, long-run solvency, and service-level solvency and can be significant in pre-
dicting bankruptcies. Alternative measures to predict the likelihood of a bankruptcy
5The full sample of local governments are only surveyed in years ending in a ‘2’ or a ‘7’.
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filing include a composite fiscal condition score, although the literature is mixed on
this approach. McDonald (2017) deems it ine↵ective and Wang et al. (2007) finds
that it is only marginally e↵ective in predicting bankruptcies.
To capture the municipal fiscal state, I include several di↵erent measures pre-
sented in Table 1.3. Cash solvency is related to liquidity and demonstrates the ability
of a local government to generate funds to pay its current liabilities. To assess the cash
solvency, I utilize Debt-to-Cash (total debt outstanding to total cash and securities)
which captures the ability of a government to balance its budget in the short-run.
Smaller values of Debt-to-Cash indicate a municipality that is more cash solvent (all
else equal). In addition to the cash solvency measure, I include the Operating Ratio
(total revenue to total expenditures) which captures budgetary solvency. This ratio
reflects the ability of a municipality to balance its budget. Increases in this ratio
reflect a municipality that is better able to balance their budget, which I expect to
have a positive and significant e↵ect on housing values and furthermore, positively
reflected in the rate of depreciation of housing. Although, this may be misleading
since many local governments are subject to balanced-budget constraints.
I use four measures of service-level solvency including EperC (total expendi-
ture to total population), RperC (total revenue to total population), TperC (total
taxes to total population), and Rev-to-CapOut (total revenue to total capital outlay).
The service-level solvency measures capture the ability of a municipality to provide
basic services in the form of local amenities. I expect increases in EperC to posi-
tively impact housing values and result in lower rates of depreciation, all else equal.
Larger values of this measure reflect a municipality with high levels of per capita
spending on amenities such as parks and schools. To measure long-run solvency, I
include LTLiability (total long-term liabilities to total interest on debt), LTLiabili-
typerC (total long-term liabilities to total population), and Debt-to-Revenue (total
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debt outstanding to total revenue). Both LTLiability and LTLiabilityperC capture
current obligations as well as any other obligations that arise upon due date. I expect
that increases in these measures will have a negative impact on housing values, as
this suggests a government that is less financially stable.
Since houses are non-fungible and largely immobile, housing markets are tied
to both the national and local level conditions. To control for local economic con-
ditions, I obtain data from the U.S. Census and BLS. To control for any existing
economic trends, I use unemployment data at the county-level. These data are from
the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Note that since the BLS only began
reporting unemployment rates at the county-level in 1990, I use the 1980 U.S. Census
unemployment rate for observations appearing prior to 1985 and the 1990 value for
observations appearing from 1985 to 1989. Furthermore, I control for both population
and population change at the county-level using population estimates from the U.S.
Census of Governments. This should account for any changes in household sorting
over time.
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics by county, MSA, and tenure. Columns
1 and 2 list the county name and the MSA of each municipality in the sample,
respectively. The year(s) that each county appear(s) in the sample is (are) listed in
column 3. Counties are observed anywhere from one to five times, with 75 percent
appearing three or more times in the sample. Columns 4–6 present the sample size by
tenure group and list the maximum number of times a given household is observed.
Over half of households appear three or more times in the sample. The sample size
of owner-occupied properties versus renter-occupied properties varies by county and
reflects the tenure breakdown for that location. Maricopa, Arizona has an owner
sample of 5,641 households, the largest of any county. San Diego, California has
the largest renter sample at 4,454 observations. Detailed descriptions of the housing
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variables and financial variables appear in Tables 1.2–1.3, respectively.
Selective descriptive statistics for the owner sample appear in Table 1.4. There
is considerable variation in self-reported housing values with median and mean hous-
ing values of $149,986 and $210,406, reflecting a right-skewed distribution. The dis-
tribution of building ages is similarly skewed, with a median building age of 30 and a
mean of over 34 years. The average number of rooms is seven and slightly over three
percent of households reside in trailers. Around 87 percent of households reside in
single-family detached houses, compared with just three percent that reside in mul-
tiunit structures, or buildings with more than four units. Notably, overall housing
satisfaction is relatively high, with a median rating of nine, and an average of 8.5.
There is significant variation in the solvency measures. The first quartile Debt-
to-Cash observation, a cash solvency measure, is 0.518. A ratio value of less than one
may reflect a municipality with a large amount of cash reserves relative to outstanding
short-term debt obligations. For the budgetary solvency measure Operating Ratio,
the mean value is 1.032 which may reflect balanced budget constraints. The ratios
with the the largest variation are LTLiability, a long-run solvency measure, and Rev-
to-CapOut, a service-level solvency measure. Both capture long-term capital and
infrastructure expenditures and are therefore subject to volatility since municipalities
may not invest in these projects at the same rate across time. The first and third
quartile of LTLiability are 12.931 and 20.315, respectively. For Rev-to-CapOut, the
median and mean observation are 1,163.672 and 1,507.223, respectively, reflecting a
right-skewed distribution. The solvency measure with the least variation is TperC,
with a standard deviation of 0.540.
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1.5 Empirical Results
The baseline model includes all controls discussed in the data section and pre-
sented in Table (1.2), excluding any solvency measures or interactions with solvency
measures. The results from the baseline estimation for the owner sample are pre-
sented in Table 1.5. In column 1 of Table 1.5, I present results using the traditional
approach, including both a linear and quadratic building age term, to capture the
possible nonlinear e↵ects of age on housing value. The coe cients on both the linear
and quadratic building age terms are significant at one percent and have the expected
signs, reflecting the nonlinear e↵ect that building age has on the response variable.
The results from the baseline estimation including the building age step function are
presented in column 2. The coe cients suggest that the rate of depreciation is higher
for relatively newer buildings and then tends to slow as the home ages, similar to
findings from Yoshida (2016).
Table 1.6 shows the results controlling for Debt-to-Cash, a cash solvency mea-
sure. This measures captures outstanding debt obligations that are due in less than
one year and larger values of this ratio suggest a municipality that is less liquid over
the short-run. In column 1, results from the linear estimation suggest that a ten
percent increase in Debt-to-Cash leads to a 0.07 percent decrease in housing values,
roughly $145. In column 2, a ten percent increase in Debt-to-Cash leads to a 0.17
percent decrease at the 0.1 quantile of housing values, over $100. This is compared
with a 0.02 increase, approximately $70, at the 0.9 quantile in column 6. The results
indicate that homeowners at the lower end of the distribution have a willingness-to-
avoid increases in Debt-to-Cash. This seems to suggest that while these households
bear the costs from from short-run capital investments such as highway and road im-
provements, they may not benefit from it. Doucet et al. (2011) discuss this new form
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of gentrification and suggest that certain areas may receive more targeted investment
money and projects. This frequently occurs when a city is trying to attract and also
keep more a✏uent residents.
I present results examining the impact of Operating Ratio, a budgetary sol-
vency measure, in Table 1.7. Larger values of this measure reflect a local government
that is more adept at balancing their budget and suggests greater fiscal health. While
the main and interaction term coe cients are insignificant in the linear estimation,
both are significant at one percent in the 0.1 and 0.25 quantile estimation in columns
2–3. In column 3, the marginal e↵ect of Operating Ratio indicates that a ten percent
increase in this measure leads to a 1.1 percent increase in housing values at the 0.25
quantile, over $1,100. The findings imply that increases in budgetary solvency have
a positive impact on low-value properties, which reflects the government’s ability to
cover current or desired service levels. This could signal to households that a mu-
nicipality may already be in a steady state of amenity provision. It should be noted
that in columns 4–6, the marginal e↵ect is also positive for high-value homeowners,
but main coe cient term on Operating Ratio is not statistically significant at one
percent.
To measure the service-level solvency of a municipality, several di↵erent mea-
sures are utilized. Table 1.8 presents the results controlling for EperC. Larger values
of this measure reflect a local government that is better able to provide public ameni-
ties. The marginal e↵ect suggests that a ten percent increase in EperC leads to over a
0.3 percent increase in the 0.25 quantile of housing values, or roughly $300. Garćıa et
al. (2010) find a similar positive e↵ect of increases in expenditures on housing values.
In column 5, at the 0.75 quantile this leads to a 0.7 percent decrease in housing values,
or around $1,800. At the 0.9 quantile, this results in roughly a 0.9 percent decrease,
over $3,500. Greater service-level solvency may positively e↵ect housing values at
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the lower end of the distribution due to the relative lack of privately provided ameni-
ties compared with those at the upper end. Nechyba and Walsh (2004) note that
fiscal amenities matter and permit high-income households to escape redistributive
taxation and improve public good quality.
The results from the estimation controlling for TperC are presented in Table
1.9, another service-level solvency measure. Larger values of TperC, suggest a more
service-level solvent government. Oates (1969) finds that increases in the property tax
rate tends to have a depressing e↵ect on housing values, using the Tiebout sorting
hypothesis to explain the finding. The marginal e↵ect of TperC on the response
variable is negative across all model estimations. In column 4, a ten percent increase
in TperC leads to an approximate 0.4 percent decrease at the 0.5 quantile of housing
values, approximately $700. By contrast, at the 0.9 quantile in column 6, this results
in a 0.9 percent decrease in housing values, around $3,800. These results suggest that
“house-rich” homeowners bear a larger burden from increases in this measure, but
the e↵ect is uniformly negative across the distribution of housing values.
In Table 1.10, I examine the impact of LTLiability, a long-run solvency mea-
sure. Larger values of measure suggest a municipality that is less solvent over the
long-run. The marginal e↵ect of LTLiability is negative across all model specifica-
tions, reflecting the shadow mortgage. At the 0.25 quantile of housing values, a ten
percent increase in LTLiability leads to a 0.2 percent decrease, around $200. In col-
umn 4, at the 0.5 quantile of housing values, a ten percent increase in LTLiability
results in a 0.1 percent decrease, or over $150. While these are relatively small e↵ects,
it should be noted that these financial measures are subject to volatility and it would
not be unreasonable to see large changes over time. Hence, a ten percent increase is
likely understating the true year-to-year change in the measure. Notably, the findings
from MacKay (2014) show a 2.5–3.7 percent decrease in housing prices as a result of
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the negative news coverage regarding municipal debt obligations.
In Table 1.11, the implied variation in annual depreciation is estimated using
the results from the linear estimation of (3.13) and evaluated at di↵erent percentiles
of the solvency variables. Notably, the short and long-run solvency measures see the
largest variation between the 10 and 90 percentiles. At the 90 percentile the implied
depreciation for Debt-to-Cash is over 0.7 percent, compared with 0.3 percent at the
10 percentile, for a di↵erence of nearly 0.4 percent annually. For LTLiability, the dif-
ference in implied annual depreciation between the 10 and 90 percentile is around 0.3
percent annually. Interestingly, higher-levels of service-level solvency tended to have
a dampening e↵ect on annual depreciation, with a di↵erence of  0.20 and  0.28 for
TperC and EperC, respectively. These findings indicate the higher levels of spending
towards amenities may help slow the rate of depreciation of housing, whereas higher
levels of debt, both over the short and long-run, tend to erode housing values more
quickly.
Selected results from the estimation of the VC model for the owner sample are
presented following the tables. They largely confirm the findings from the empirical
results of the linear and quantile regressions. The estimation of Figure 1.1 suggests
that the e↵ect of Debt-to-Cash on housing values is positive for relatively new to
average-aged buildings, but the relationship is nearly linearly negative. The e↵ect of
the Operating Ratio is positive across building ages, with wide confidence intervals,
and has the strongest positive e↵ect on the oldest structures in the sample. In Figure
1.3, the e↵ect of EperC on housing values is highly nonlinear and largely negative,
although there does appear to be a positive impact on housing values for the oldest
properties in the sample. For LTLiability in Figure 1.5, the impact of this ratio on
housing values is positive for buildings 20 years or younger. For older properties,
increases in this measure negatively impact housing values.
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Along with the main model specifications, I include additional owner sample
model estimations as well as the full renter sample estimation in the separate ap-
pendix. The results for the renter sample estimation are very similar to the empirical
findings of the owner sample estimation and suggest the theoretical model is appro-
priate to use for model predictions. Furthermore, the estimates of implied annual
depreciation for the renter-occupied sample remained similar, with less variability,
to the estimation using the owner sample. All the models estimated for the owner-
occupied specification are similarly estimated for the renter sample, but with the
noted di↵erences as discussed in Section 1.3.
1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper examines and provides evidence for capitalization of the shadow
mortgage. For the average-aged building, increases in cash and long-run solvency
measures, suggesting a less-solvent local government, negatively impact housing val-
ues. Specifically, a ten percent increase in total debt outstanding to total interest
on debt results in an approximate 0.2 decline in housing values at the 0.1 quantile,
roughly $100. By contrast, at the 0.9 quantile of housing values, a ten percent in-
crease in this measure leads to a 0.02 percent, or around $70. While these e↵ects are
small for the individual homeowner, they can have significant impacts in aggregate. It
should also be noted that due to the volatile nature of government investment, on av-
erage a ten percent change in these measures likely understates the true year-to-year
change.
Unsurprisingly, increases in per capita expenditure positively impact housing
values at the lower end of the distribution. A ten percent increase leads to a 0.6
percent increase, nearly $400, at the 0.1 quantile. Surprisingly, the results suggest
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that at the 0.9 quantile, this results in a 0.9 percent decrease, over $3,500. Notably,
Skidmore and Scorsone (2011) find that in times of fiscal stress, municipalities respond
by cutting back on recreation spending and capital improvements, as well as other
maintenance projects. These findings suggest that local governments should focus
on amenity-spending, even in economic downturns, to shield local housing values,
especially low-value properties. In regards to taxation, Mieszkowski and Zodrow
(1989) discuss two opposing views on the property tax. They consist of the benefit
view, suggesting it is e↵ectively a head tax, and the new view which suggests that
capital bears the average burden of the tax. While I do not explicitly examine the
impact of the property tax, my findings suggest that increases in taxes per capita has
a uniformly negative impact on housing values, with high-value properties bearing a
larger impact.
Moreover, Brueckner and Helsley (2011) illustrate how the market failures
contributing to urban sprawl also impact and contribute to urban blight. They note
that excessive suburban development can depress central-city housing and undermine
maintenance incentives, leading to deficient levels of central-city investment. The
policy implication would suggest shifting populations from the suburbs to city-center
with reinvestments. This is further supported by the results from the estimation
of depreciation which finds lower depreciation rates in areas with high per-capita
expenditures, whereas municipalities with large cash and long-run measures have
higher depreciation rates on average.
While gentrification is highly debated in local communities, Lang (1986) as-
serts that gentrification may promote municipal fiscal health if it increases the tax
base by attracting a✏uent households. My findings are supported by previous studies
including Hilber (2017) who find evidence that public and private investments and
also intergovernmental transfers get capitalized into local house prices, especially in
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areas with strict regulatory and supply constraints. Local governments can benefit
select groups by focusing their spending on certain areas as subject to their budgetary
allowances. The policy implications of these findings may be useful to address urban
issues through focused municipal spending.
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Table 1.1: Housing Data Sample Statistics
County MSA Years No. owners No. renters Max no. obs.
Adams, CO Denver 86, 90, 95, 04, 11 1,116 454 3
Alameda, CA San Francisco 85, 89, 93 1,185 1,134 3
Alexandria City, VA Washington 85, 89, 93, 98, 07 125 224 3
Allegheny, PA Pittsburgh 86, 90, 95, 04, 11 2,882 1,467 3
Arapahoe, CO Denver 86, 90, 95, 04, 11 1,579 506 3
Arlington, VA Washington 85, 89, 93, 98, 07 199 200 3
Ashtabula, OH Cleveland 04 88 10 1
Baltimore City, MD Baltimore 87, 91, 98, 07 644 496 2
Baltimore, MD Baltimore 87, 91, 98, 07 1,197 506 2
Beaver, PA Pittsburgh 86, 90, 95, 04, 11 478 119 3
Boulder, CO Denver 86, 90 218 256 2
Brazoria, TX Houston 87, 91 80 52 2
Broward, FL Miami 86, 90, 95, 04, 11 1,980 1,075 3
Bucks, PA Philadelphia 85, 89 298 156 2
Burlington, NJ Philadelphia 85, 89 162 94 2
Butler, OH Mansfield 11 195 26 1
Butler, PA Pittsburgh 95, 04, 11 310 76 3
Camden, NJ Philadelphia 85, 89 157 99 2
Chambers, TX Houston 98 10 3 1
Chester, PA Philadelphia 85, 89 127 95 2
Clark, WA Seattle 86, 90, 95, 02 910 546 2
Clayton, GA Atlanta 87, 91, 96, 04, 11 238 190 3
Cobb, GA Atlanta 87, 91, 96, 04, 11 815 586 2
Collin, TX Dallas 85, 89, 94, 02, 11 840 381 4
Contra Costa, CA San Francisco 85, 89, 93 871 648 3
Cook, IL Chicago 87, 91 931 698 2
Cuyahoga, OH Cleveland 84, 88, 92, 96, 04, 11 4,608 1,280 3
Dade, FL Miami 86 277 191 1
Dallas, TX Dallas 85, 89, 94, 02, 11 3,146 3,382 4
Davis, UT Salt Lake 84, 88, 92, 98 1,060 411 3
Delaware, PA Philadelphia 85, 89 235 76 2
Denton, TX Dallas 85, 89, 94, 02, 11 583 374 4
Denver, CO Denver 86, 90, 95, 04, 11 1,518 1,318 3
Du Page, IL Chicago 87, 91 140 111 2
Erie, NY Bu↵alo 84, 88, 94, 02, 11 3,822 1,303 4
Fayette, PA Pittsburgh 86, 90, 04, 11 236 83 2
Frederick, MD Washington 85, 89, 93, 98, 07 237 77 3
Gloucester, NJ Philadelphia 85, 89 75 32 2
Gwinnett, GA Atlanta 87, 91, 96, 04, 11 811 393 3
Hamilton, OH Cincinnati 86, 90, 98, 11 1,883 729 2
Harford, MD Baltimore 87, 91, 98, 07 464 94 2
Hillsborough, FL Tampa 85, 89, 93, 98, 07 1,903 1,396 3
Jackson, MO Kansas City 86, 90, 95, 02 1,834 1,100 2
Je↵erson, AL Birmingham 84, 88, 92, 98, 11 3,745 2,373 3
Je↵erson, MO Kansas City 87, 91, 96, 04 388 94 2
Kane, IL Chicago 87, 91 58 34 2
King, WA Seattle 04, 09 1,700 768 2
Lake, IL Chicago 87, 91 70 31 2
Livingston, MI Detroit 85, 89, 93 69 29 2
Lorain, OH Cleveland 11 160 36 1
Los Angeles, CA Los Angeles 85, 89, 11 2,927 2,864 2
Macomb, MI Detroit 85, 89, 93 551 182 3
Maricopa, AZ Phoenix 85, 89, 94, 02, 11 5,641 4,276 4
Marin, CA San Francisco 85, 89, 93, 98, 11 600 458 3
McHenry, IL Chicago 91 25 16 1
Milwaukee, WI Milwaukee 84, 88, 94, 02, 11 2,656 2,202 4
Monroe, MI Detroit 85, 89, 93 89 33 3
Monroe, NY Bu↵alo 86, 90, 98 2,185 955 2
Montgomery, MD Washington 85, 89, 93, 98, 07 1,027 395 3
Montgomery, PA Philadelphia 85, 89 323 166 2
Newport News City, VA Norfolk 84, 88, 92, 98 550 387 3
Niagara, NY Bu↵alo 84, 88, 94, 02, 11 912 416 4
Norfolk City, VA Norfolk 84, 88, 92 522 522 3
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Housing Data Sample Statistics — continued
County MSA Years No. owners No. renters Max no. obs.
Oakland, MI Detroit 85, 89, 93 637 562 3
Orange, CA Anaheim 86, 90, 94, 02, 11 5,418 4,418 4
Palm Beach, FL Miami 07 173 32 1
Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia 85, 89 269 221 2
Pierce, WA Seattle 87, 91, 09 615 525 2
Pinal, AZ Phoenix 11 72 17 1
Pinellas, FL Tampa 85, 89, 93, 98, 07 2,142 1,505 3
Portsmouth City, VA Norfolk 84, 88, 92 282 177 3
Prince Georges, MD Washington 85, 89, 93, 98, 07 931 411 3
Riverside, CA San Bernardino 86, 90, 94, 02 2,224 1,618 4
Salt Lake, UT Salt Lake 84, 88, 92, 98 4,086 2,645 3
San Bernardino, CA San Bernardino 86, 90, 94, 02 2,228 2,110 4
San Diego, CA San Diego 91, 94, 02, 11 4,434 4,454 3
San Francisco, CA San Francisco 85, 89, 93, 98, 11 811 1,722 3
San Mateo, CA San Francisco 85, 89, 93, 98, 11 1,710 975 3
Snohomish, WA Olympia 09 55 12 1
St. Louis City, MO St. Louis 87, 91, 96, 04, 11 453 372 3
St. Louis, MO St. Louis 87, 91, 96, 04, 11 2,523 801 3
Virginia Beach City, VA Norfolk 84, 88, 92, 98 1,559 928 3
Washington, DC Washington 85, 89, 93, 98, 07 302 398 3
Washington, PA Pittsburgh 86, 90, 95, 04 372 90 2
Waukesha, WI Milwaukee 84, 88, 94, 02, 11 1,554 375 4
Wayne, MI Detroit 85, 89, 93 1,309 781 3
Weber, UT Salt Lake 88, 92, 98 732 353 2


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics for Owner Sample
— Owner Sample —
Variable Q1 Median Mean Q3 Std. Dev.
Unit & Household
Building age 17 30 33.712 48 21.294
Number of rooms 5 6 6.576 8 1.717
Number of bathrooms 1 2 1.696 2 0.718
Trailer 0 0 0.032 0 0.175
Fireplace 0 1 0.530 1 0.499
Balcony 1 1 0.897 1 0.303
Central ac 0 1 0.556 1 0.497
Central heat 1 1 0.751 1 0.432
Detached structure 1 1 0.869 1 0.338
Large structure 0 0 0.026 0 0.158
Housing satisfaction 8 9 8.484 10 1.491
Neighborhood satisfaction 7 8 8.140 10 1.796
Missing roof 0 0 0.021 0 0.143
Visible cracks 0 0 0.041 0 0.198
Broken windows 0 0 0.018 0 0.133
Covered parking 1 1 0.840 1 0.367
Housing value ($) 98533.160 149986.400 210406.300 247569.400 215884.900
Log housing value ($) 11.498 11.918 12.257 12.419 0.926
Log square footage 0.262 0.588 0.577 0.875 0.501
Log household income ($) 10.593 11.115 11.024 11.542 0.876
Log population 13.387 13.745 13.782 14.360 0.871
Financial Ratios
Debt-to-Cash 0.518 0.859 1.089 1.282 1.198
STDebt-to-Cash 0 0 0.051 0.011 0.185
Operating Ratio 0.982 1.031 1.032 1.078 0.106
LT Liability 12.931 15.877 18.663 20.315 24.975
LTLiabilityperC 0.396 0.722 1.275 1.531 1.778
Debt-to-Revenue 0.470 0.797 0.968 1.212 0.744
TperC 0.222 0.319 0.482 0.510 0.540
RperC 0.655 1.102 1.374 1.618 1.321
EperC 0.637 1.084 1.332 1.566 1.228
Rev-to-CapOut 706.854 1163.672 1507.223 1739.885 1458.572
*All dollar values are in 2010 U.S. dollars.
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Table 1.5: Baseline Linear Model Estimates
Dependent Variable: — Owner Sample —
Log housing value (1) Linear (2) Linear
Building Age  0.0082***
(0.0012)
Building Age2 5.32 ⇥10 05***
(1.20 ⇥10 05)
Building Age
⇥ I(0 - 8 years)  0.0131***
(0.0028)
⇥ I(9 - 17 years)  0.0073***
(0.0013)
⇥ I(18 - 26 years)  0.0061***
(0.0009)
⇥ I(27 - 35 years)  0.0047***
(0.0007)
⇥ I(36 - 44 years)  0.0036***
(0.0006)
⇥ I(45 - 53 years)  0.0029***
(0.0005)
⇥ I(54 - 62 years)  0.0023***
(0.0005)
⇥ I(63 - 71 years)  0.0024***
(0.0005)
⇥ I(72 - 80 years)  0.0015***
(0.0005)
⇥ I(80 years +)  0.0008
(0.0006)
This table presents selected results from the baseline estimation of (3.12) without controlling for any financial measures.
The sample consists of 100,577 observations from 1984 to 2011 and includes 88 counties in total. All models include the full
set of controls, year and location fixed e↵ects, and building age is interacted with an indicator if the unit is detached and
the floor area of the unit (logged and demeaned). In columns 1–2, the adjusted R-squared values are 0.6021 and 0.6022,
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county-level using AHS sample weights. ***, **,










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.1: Nonparametric Building Age Interaction with Debt-to-Cash
This figure presents results from the estimation of (3.17) controlling for Debt-to-Cash (total debt outstanding to
total cash and securities) with 95% point-wise confidence interval. Building age is estimated nonparametrically
using a thin plate spline and interacted with Debt-to-Cash (logged and demeaned), an indicator if the unit is
detached, and the floor area (logged and demeaned). All smooth terms are significant at 1% with p-values
approximately less than 0.001.
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Figure 1.2: Nonparametric Building Age Interaction with the Operating Ratio
This figure presents results from the estimation of (3.17) controlling for Operating Ratio (total revenue to total
expenditure) with 95% point-wise confidence interval. Building age is estimated nonparametrically using a thin
plate spline and interacted with the Operating Ratio (logged and demeaned), an indicator if the unit is detached,
and the floor area (logged and demeaned). All smooth terms are significant at 1% with p-values approximately less
than 0.001. Note the scale change from other figures.
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Figure 1.3: Nonparametric Building Age Interaction with EperC
This figure presents results from the estimation of (3.17) controlling for EperC (total expenditure to total
population) with 95% point-wise confidence interval. Building age is estimated nonparametrically using a thin plate
spline and interacted with the EperC (logged and demeaned), an indicator if the unit is detached, and the floor area
(logged and demeaned). All smooth terms are significant at 1% with p-values approximately less than 0.001.
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Figure 1.4: Nonparametric Building Age Interaction with TperC
This figure presents results from the estimation of (3.17) controlling for TperC (total revenue to total population)
with 95% point-wise confidence interval. Building age is estimated nonparametrically using a thin plate spline and
interacted with the TperC (logged and demeaned), an indicator if the unit is detached, and the floor area (logged
and demeaned). All smooth terms are significant at 1% with p-values approximately less than 0.001.
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Figure 1.5: Nonparametric Building Age Interaction with LTLiability
This figure presents results from the estimation of (3.17) controlling for LTLiability (total long-term debt
outstanding to total interest on debt) with 95% point-wise confidence interval. Building age is estimated
nonparametrically using a thin plate spline and interacted with the LTLIability (logged and demeaned), an indicator
if the unit is detached, and the floor area (logged and demeaned). All smooth terms are significant at 1% with
p-values approximately less than 0.001.
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Chapter 2
Benchmarking the Performance of
U.S. Municipalities with Paul W.
Wilson
Municipal governments provide varying bundles of goods, services and ameni-
ties for residents, who in turn are free to choose among municipalities and hence the
varying o↵erings. In addition to police and fire protection, municipal governments
may provide roads and streets, tra c management, trash collection, street cleaning,
water services, libraries, and other services. In principle, municipalities compete with
each other both in terms of taxation as well as provision of services. Grosskopf et al.
(2001) note that competition among municipalities may create incentives to provide
services e ciently by influencing citizens’ willingness to pay for public services or
their inclination to remain in the jurisdiction. Hayes et al. (1998), Grossman et al.
(1999) and others find evidence that competition among local governments tends to
enhance e ciency. At the same time, friction caused by real estate transaction fees,
costs of commuting and job search and other factors may reduce competition among
44
municipalities, perhaps leading to ine cient provision of services.
Grosskopf et al. (2001) also suggest that monitoring by voters may encourage
e ciency among municipalities. Government o cials may increase their probability
of remaining in o ce by running local governments e ciently, particularly where
residents are personally a↵ected by local policy. Davis and Hayes (1993) argue that
citizens are more likely to closely monitor local governments where taxes are high, and
that housing owners are more likely to watch closely than renters because they have a
larger stake in outcomes. Davis and Hayes (1993), Grossman and West (1994), Hayes
and Wood (1995) and Hayes et al. (1998) find evidence that increased monitoring
(proxied by tax rates or the degree of centralization by local governments) is associated
with smaller or more e cient local governments. Here again, however, the e↵ect of
voter monitoring on local government e ciency may be limited by lack of accessibility
to government o cials, incumbents’ inherent advantages over challengers in the polls,
lack of information and other factors.
This paper examines the technical e ciency of U.S. municipal governments
during 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012 using data from the U.S. Census of Governments
and the Annual Survey of State and Local Finances. The data cover the recent fi-
nancial crisis of 2007–2008 and beyond when many municipalities struggled to meet
expenses in the face of falling tax revenues. Several U.S. cities have filed for Chap-
ter 9 bankruptcy in the aftermath of the financial crisis, including Vallejo, CA in
2008; Harrisburg, PA in 2011; Central Falls, RI in 2011; Stockton, CA in 2012; San
Bernardino, CA in 2012; Detroit, MI in 2013; and Hillview, KY in 2015.1 With
bankruptcies, rising pension burdens, mandatory balanced-budget constraints, and
limited and dwindling sources of future revenue, the question of whether municipal
governments use scarce resources to provide services e ciently is an important topic
1The Harrisburg case was subsequently dismissed.
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in the post-recession climate.
The idea that municipal governments should—but sometimes do not—provide
services e ciently is an old one. Tiebout (1956) was the first to discuss competition
in local government production, remarking that households sort based on their pref-
erences for public goods and services. He notes that municipal competition increases
overall e ciency. These e ciency gains are often capitalized in local property val-
ues. By contrast, Bruère et al. (1912) state that “the e ciency movement in cities
grew out of recognition of the dependence of community welfare upon government
activity” beginning in 1906, and that the e ciency movement “aims to remove city
government from its isolation, and to make it the customary and accepted common
agency for ‘getting things done’.” However, municipal governments provide a classic
example of the principal-agent problem. Residents pay taxes and consume services,
but must delegate management of municipal governments to politicians, bureaucrats
and functionaries.
A number of empirical studies have examined e ciency among local govern-
ments (e.g., see the reviews by Tang, 1997; De Borger and Kerstens, 2000; Afonso,
2008; Da Cruz and Marques, 2014; De Oliveira Junqueira, 2015; and Narbón-Perpiñá
and De Witte, 2018). The empirical analyses can be broadly divided into those that
employ fully parametric methods along the lines of Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen
and van den Broeck (1977) versus those that use fully nonparametric methods such
as the data envelopment analysis (DEA) estimators proposed by Farrell (1957) and
popularized by Banker et al. (1984) or free disposal hull (FDH) estimators proposed
by Deprins et al. (1984). Both parametric and nonparametric studies have typically
reported only point estimates of e ciency, with no inference. In studies of local
government e ciency, nonparametric methods are more often used than parametric
methods, and among studies using nonparametric methods, DEA estimators that im-
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pose convexity on the production set are used much more often than FDH estimators
that do not impose convexity.2 The choice between FDH and DEA estimators is not
innocuous—DEA estimators are not statistically consistent if the production set is
not convex, while FDH estimators are consistent regardless of whether the production
set is convex (see Simar and Wilson, 2013, 2015 for details and discussion).
This study employs nonparametric methods, thereby avoiding troublesome
functional form assumptions. The translog specification is often used for production
and cost functions in parametric applications. Among the 31 papers listed by Narbón-
Perpiñá and De Witte (2018, Table A2) that employ parametric methods to assess
local government performance, 27 use a translog specification, Nikolov and Hrovatin
(2013) and Pacheco, Sanchez, and Villena (2014) use a Cobb-Douglas specification
(which of course is nested by the translog specification), and Hayes and Chang (1990)
and Revelli (2009) use alternative model specifications.
However, municipal governments vary widely in terms of size, and several stud-
ies have noted that the parameters of a translog function are unlikely to be stable
when the function is fit globally across units of widely varying size. See, for exam-
ple, Guilkey et al. (1983) and Chalfant and Gallant (1985) for Monte Carlo evidence,
and Cooper and McLaren (1996) and Banks et al. (1997) for empirical evidence in-
volving consumer demand, Wilson and Carey (2004) for empirical evidence involving
hospitals, and McAllister and McManus (1993), Mitchell and Onvural (1996), and
Wheelock and Wilson (2001, 2012, 2018) for empirical evidence involving banks.
In addition, recent theoretical results on the properties of nonparametric e -
ciency estimators are used to test convexity versus non-convexity of municipal govern-
2The review by Narbón-Perpiñá and De Witte (2018, Table A2) lists 97 empirical studies of
local government e ciency. Sixty-six of these studies used nonparametric estimators, while only 31
use parametric methods. Among the 66 papers employing nonparametric estimators, 50 use DEA
estimators, 14 use FDH estimators, and 2 use both.
47
ments’ production sets, and to test for di↵erences in mean e ciency across regions as
well as across time. The data reject convexity in favor of non-convexity, and this result
casts substantial doubt on previous studies that have arbitrarily imposed convexity
without testing.3 This study, to our knowledge, is the first to combine nonparametric
estimation of e ciency with rigorous, statistically valid inference-making to look at
the e ciency of municipal governments.
The paper proceeds as follows. A statistical model and relevant estimators
are presented in the next section. In addition, various statistical results needed for
testing hypotheses about model features are also discussed in Section 2.1. The data
used for estimation and inference are discussed in Section 2.2, and empirical results
are presented in Section 2.3. Summary and conclusions are given in Section 2.4.
2.1 Methods for Estimation and Inference
To establish notation, let X 2 Rp+ and Y 2 Rq+ denote random vectors of input
and output quantities, and similarly let x 2 Rp+ and y 2 Rq+ denote corresponding
fixed, nonstochastic vectors of input and output quantities. The production set is the
set of feasible combinations of input and output quantities, i.e.,
 := {(x, y) | x can produce y}, (1.1)
3In addition to the 50 papers listed by Narbón-Perpiñá and De Witte (2018, Table A2) that
employ DEA (but not FDH) to examine cities’ e ciencies, see also and Charnes et al. (1989),
Duncombe et al. (1997), Hájková and Hájek (2014). A search on Google Scholar on 18 December
2019 using the keywords “DEA”, “e ciency” and “cities” yielded approximately 39,300 hits. A few
studies (e.g., De Borger and Kerstens (1996), Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007a) and Geys and Moesen
(2009) estimate cities’ e ciencies using both FDH and DEA estimators and note that the estimates
are di↵erent, but do not test whether the production set is convex (and hence whether consistency
holds for DEA estimators).
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which gives the set of possible inputs and outputs. Standard assumptions in the
microeconomic theory of the firm include the following (e.g., see Shephard or Färe).
Assumption 2.1.1  is closed.
Assumption 2.1.2 Production requires the use of some inputs, i.e., (x, y) 62  if
x = 0, y   0, y 6= 0.
Assumption 2.1.3 Inputs and outputs are strongly disposable, i.e., 8 (x, y) 2  , (i)
ex   x ) (ex, y) 2  and (ii) ey  y ) (x, ey) 2  .
Assumption 2.1.1 ensures that the e cient frontier or technology
 @ :=
 
(x, y) | (x, y) 2  , (  1x,  y) /2  for any   2 (1,1)
 
(1.2)
consisting of the set of extreme points of  is contained in  . We define inequalities
involving vectors on an element-by-element basis. Assumption 2.1.2 requires use of
some inputs to produce any output greater than zero, thereby ruling out the existence
of free lunches (throughout, inequalities involving vectors are defined on an element-
by-element basis). Assumption 2.1.3 amounts to imposition of weak monotonicity on
the frontier.
The frontier  @ provides a benchmark against which production units’ per-
formance can be measured. Units operating on the frontier are said to be technically
e cient, while those operating under the frontier, in the interior of  , are said to
be technically ine cient. Several measures of technical (in)e ciency are employed in
the literature. The Farrell (1957) input e ciency measure
✓(x, y |  ) := inf {✓ | (✓x, y) 2  } (1.3)
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gives the proportion by which input levels can be feasibly reduced without reducing
output levels. Alternatively, the Farrell (1957) output e ciency measure
 (x, y |  ) := sup {  | (x, y) 2  } . (1.4)
gives the feasible proportion by which output levels can be increased without increas-
ing input quantities. Alternatively, the hyperbolic measure
 (x, y |  ) := inf
 
  > 0 | ( x,   1y) 2  
 
(1.5)
proposed by Färe et al. (1985) gives the proportion by which output quantities can
be increased while simultaneously reducing input quantities by the same proportion.
Clearly, ✓(x, y |  )  1,  (x, y |  )   1, and  (x, y |  )  1 for all (x, y) 2  .
Moreover, due to Assumptions 2.1.1 and 2.1.3,  (x, y |  ) = 1 for any (x, y) 2  @ .4
It is important to note that  , and hence @ as well as the measures ✓(x, y |  ),
 (x, y |  ) and  (x, y |  ) are unobserved. Consequently, they must be estimated
from a sample Sn = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 of observed input-output pairs. There are several
possibilities.
Deprins et al. (1984) estimate  by the free disposal hull of the sample obser-





(x, y) 2 Rp+q+ | x   Xi, y  Yi
 
. (1.6)
This estimator does not impose convexity on  . Alternatively,  can be estimated
using the VRS (DEA) proposed by Farrell (1957) and popularized by Banker et al.
4In principle, for some (x, y) 2  @ one might have ✓(x, y |  ) < 1 or  (x, y |  ) > 1 if the frontier
is parallel to either all of the input axes or all of the output axes in some regions. However, this is
ruled out by additional assumptions made below to define a statistical model.
50













Y1, . . . , Yn
◆
are (p⇥n) and (q⇥n) matrices
of input and output vectors, respectively; in is an (n ⇥ 1) vector of ones, and ! is
a (n ⇥ 1) vector of weights. The estimator b VRS,n imposes convexity, but allows for
VRS. Dropping the constraint i0n! = 1 in (1.7) results in the constant returns-to-scale
(CRS) estimator b CRS,n of  . Note that CRS holds if and only if (↵x,↵y) 2  for
all (x, y) 2  and ↵ 2 (0,1).
Estimators of the e ciency measures ✓(x, y |  ),  (x, y |  ) and  (x, y |  )
defined above are obtained by substituting either b FDH,n, b VRS,n or b CRS,n for  in
(1.3)–(1.5) (respectively). For example, substituting b VRS,n for  in (1.3)–(1.5) yields
b✓VRS(x, y | Sn) = min
✓,!
 
✓ | y  Y !, ✓x   X!, i0n! = 1, ! 2 Rn+
 
, (1.8)
b VRS(x, y | Sn) = max
 ,!
 




b VRS(x, y | Sn) = min
 ,!
 
  |   1y  Y !,  x   X!, i0n! = 1, ! 2 Rn+
 
. (1.10)
The estimators in (1.8)–(1.9) can be computed using linear programming methods.
The hyperbolic estimator in 1.10 is a non-linear program and can be computed easily
using the algorithm developed by Wilson (2011).
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Substituting b FDH,n into (1.3)–(1.5) results in integer programming prob-
lems. Nonetheless, the resulting estimators can be computed easily. In particu-
lar, let Dx,y denote the set indices of points in Sn dominating (x, y), i.e., Dx,y =
{i | (Xi, Yi) 2 Sn, Xi  x, Yi   y}. Then









where for a vector a, aj denotes its j-th component. The output-oriented estimator
can be computed by solving









and the hyperbolic estimator can be computed by solving














as shown by Wilson (2011).
Of course, in addition to estimation, inference is needed before anything can
be learned from data, and inference requires a well-defined statistical model. The
following assumptions, together with Assumptions 2.1.1–2.1.3, complete the model
and are su cient to establish properties of the estimators that will be used later.
Assumption 2.1.4 (i) The random variables (X, Y ) possess a joint density f with
support D ⇢  ; and (ii) f is continuously di↵erentiable on D.
Assumption 2.1.5 (i) D⇤ := {✓(x, y |  )x, y) | (x, y) 2 D} = {(x,  (x, y |  )y) | (x, y) 2 D} =
{( (x, y |  )x,  (x, y |  ) 1y) | (x, y) 2 D} ⇢ D; (ii) D⇤ is compact; and (iii) f(✓(x, y |
 )x, y) > 0 for all (x, y) 2 D.
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Assumption 2.1.4–2.1.5 describe a probability model (which is a component
of every statistical model). Assumption 2.1.4(i) means that any observed input-
output data fall within the production set  , while Assumption 2.1.4(ii) imposes
some smoothness on the joint density f of inputs and outputs. Assumption 2.1.5
implies that the density f is strictly positive along any part of the frontier where
observations in D might be projected to by one of the e ciency measures introduced
above. In addition, Assumption 2.1.5 rules out infinite input levels, which should not
be troubling and which simplifies derivation of the estimators’ properties.
The VRS estimators described above require the next two assumptions.
Assumption 2.1.6 ✓(x, y |  ),  (x, y |  ) and  (x, y |  ) are three times continu-
ously di↵erentiable on D.
Assumption 2.1.7 D is almost strictly convex; i.e., for any (x, y), (ex, ey) 2 D with
( xkxk , y) 6= (
ex
kexk , ey), the set {(x
⇤, y⇤) | (x⇤, y⇤) = (x, y)+↵((ex, ey)  (x, y)) for some 0 <
↵ < 1} is a subset of the interior of D.
Kneip et al. (2008) require only two-times di↵erentiability to establish the ex-
istence of a limiting distribution for VRS estimators, but the stronger Assumption
2.1.6 is needed by Kneip et al. (2015) to establish results on moments of the VRS
estimators. Assumption 2.1.6 imposes more smoothness on the frontier than required
by Kneip et al. (2008). Recalling that the strong (i.e., free) disposability assumed
in Assumption 2.1.3 implies that the frontier is weakly monotone, Assumption 2.1.7
strengthens this by requiring the frontier to be strictly monotone with no constant
segments. This is also needed to establish properties of moments of the VRS estima-
tors.
Alternatively, when FDH estimators are used, Assumptions 2.1.6 and 2.1.7
can be replaced by the following assumption.
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Assumption 2.1.8 (i) ✓(x, y |  ),  (x, y |  ) and  (x, y |  ) are twice continuously
di↵erentiable on D; and (ii) all the first-order partial derivatives of ✓(x, y |  ),  (x, y |
 ) and  (x, y |  ) with respect to x and y are nonzero at any point (x, y) 2 D.
Assumption 2.1.8 strengthens the assumption of strong disposability in 2.1.3
by requiring that the frontier is strictly monotone and does not possess constant
segments.5 Finally, part (i) of Assumption 2.1.8 is weaker than Assumption 2.1.6; here
the frontier is required to be smooth, but not as smooth as required by Assumption
2.1.6.6 Assumptions 2.1.1–2.1.5 and Assumption 2.1.8 comprise a statistical model
appropriate for use of FDH estimators of technical e ciency, while Assumptions 2.1.1–
2.1.7 comprise a statistical model appropriate for use of VRS estimators of technical
e ciency.7
Under the appropriate set of assumptions—either Assumptions 2.1.1–2.1.5 and
Assumption 2.1.8 for the FDH estimators, or Assumptions 2.1.1–2.1.7 for the VRS
estimators—the various e ciency estimators have well-developed statistical proper-
ties. Kneip et al. (1998) establish consistency and the rate of convergence of the
input-oriented VRS e ciency estimator. Kneip et al. (2008) derive its limiting dis-
tribution. Park et al. (2000) and Daouia et al. (2017) provide the rate of convergence
and the limiting distribution of the input-oriented FDH e ciency estimator. These
results extend trivially to the output orientation. Wheelock and Wilson (2008) extend
the results to the hyperbolic FDH e ciency estimator, and Wilson (2011) establishes
similar properties for the hyperbolic VRS estimator. In all cases, the FDH esti-
mators converge at rate n1/(p+q), while the VRS estimators converge at the faster
5Constant segments, neither increasing nor decreasing in inputs, might occur if outputs are
discrete (i.e., “lumpy”), rather than continuous.
6Assumption 2.1.8 is slightly stronger, but much simpler than assumptions AII–AIII in Park et
al. (2000).
7Additional, stronger assumptions are needed for constant returns-to-scale e ciency estimators.
See Kneip et al. (2015) for additional discussion.
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rate n2/(p+q+1). Consequently, both FDH and VRS estimators su↵er from the “curse
of dimensionality” that typically plagues nonparametric estimators. Wilson (2018)
provides evidence that the problem can be mitigated in many situations by using
dimension-reduction techniques.
By construction, both the FDH and VRS e ciency estimators are biased. This
is due to the fact that b FDH,n ✓  and b VRS,n ✓  provided  is convex. Kneip et al.
(2015) provide results on moments of the input-oriented e ciency estimators, and the
results extend trivially to the output-oriented estimators. Kneip et al. (2018) extend
these results to the hyperbolic VRS e ciency estimator, and Wilson (2019) extends
the results toe the hyperbolic FDH estimator. In all cases, the bias of the estimators
disappears at the same rate at which the estimators converge. Consequently, for a
convergence rate of n—where  = 1/(p+q) for the FDH estimators,  = 2/(p+q+1)
for the VRS estimators, or  = 2/(p + q) for the CRS estimators—standard central
limit theorem (CLT) results (e.g., the Lindeberg-Feller CLT) do not hold for mean
e ciency unless  > 1/2. In the CRS case, this means that the usual CLTs hold only
if (p+ q) < 4. In the VRS case, the usual CLTs hold only if (p+ q) < 3. In the FDH
case, standard CLTs hold only if p+ q < 2.8
In addition to deriving properties on moments of the input-oriented e ciency
estimators, Kneip et al. (2015) provide new CLTs (for all values of ) for means of the
input-oriented FDH, VRS and CRS estimators. Kneip et al. (2016) use these results
to establish asymptotically normal test statistics that can be used to test convexity
versus non-convexity of  , CRS versus VRS (provided  is convex), and di↵erences
in mean e ciency across groups of producers. All these results extend trivially to the
output-oriented cases. Kneip et al. (2018) extend these results to the hyperbolic VRS
8In other words, standard CLT results hold in the FDH case if and only if p = 1 and output is
fixed and constant, or q = 1 and input is fixed and constant.
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estimator, and Wilson (2019) extends the results to the hyperbolic FDH estimator.
2.2 Data and Variable Specification
We use data from the the Annual Survey of State and Local Government
Finances, the Annual U.S. Building and Permit Survey, the U.S. Census of Govern-
ments, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) to define input and output variables. Our variable specifications are
broadly similar to those use in other studies of local governments’ e ciency levels.
All dollar amounts are measured in terms of thousands of constant, 2010 U.S. dollars.
The majority of local-government e ciency studies employ a single input vari-
able to account for resources used to produce goods and services. Total current oper-
ating expenditures is the most widely specified input; examples include Štastná and
Gregor (2015) and Radulović and Dragutinović (2015). Alternatively, a few studies
have specified input as total expenditures (e.g., Hayes and Chang, 1990) or financial
expenditures (e.g., De Borger and Kerstens, 1996). We adopt the former, more typi-
cal approach and specify a single input (denoted by X, and hence p = 1) consisting
of total current operating expenditures reported in the Annual Survey of State and
Local Government Finances. This survey is the only source of comprehensive, na-
tionwide data on local government finances. Unfortunately, the survey only provides
a full sample of local governments every five years (specifically, in years ending in ‘2’
or ‘7’).
In recent years, local governments have seen rising costs, exceeding the rate of
increasing costs in the private sector, which is likely reflected in our input measure.
Berry and Lowery (1984) speculate that Baumol’s “cost disease” may be driving
this di↵erence, since many local public goods are labor-intensive or hand-produced.
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Moreover, there has been an increasing level of concentration of government provision
of goods and services at the federal level. Baicker et al. (2012) suggest this may be due
to the growing importance of certain budget components including education, health,
and welfare programs. By contrast, total and financial expenditures (as opposed to
operating expenditures, which we use) include expenditures on total capital outlays,
which is susceptible to volatility due to the nature of government spending. In this
sense, our variable captures short-run operating costs.
We specify q = 6 output variables, including total population (Y1), total
charges for sewerage and waste management (Y2), the reciprocal of the total crime
rate (Y3), total land area (in square miles) (Y4), total building permits (Y5) and and
the employment rate (Y6). Our specification of outputs reflects the wide variety of
goods and services provided by municipal governments. Total population is one of
the most frequently specified outputs in the literature on local-government e ciency
(see lo Storto, 2013 and Athanassopoulos and Triantis, 1998) and serves as a proxy
the scope of demand for publicly provided goods and services. We use total charges
for sewerage and waste removal or treatment to account for communal service ad-
ministration. Worthington (2000) utilizes a similar output measure related to the
municipal sewerage system and waste collection, while Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007b)
use the number of street lights.9 Data for Y1 and Y2 are obtained from the Annual
Survey of State and Local Government Finance.
We use the reciprocal of the total municipal crime rate, Y3, to capture the
degree of public safety provided through law enforcement services. These data are
obtained from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics which are voluntarily
reported by police departments at the local level. The FBI defines total violent
9Alternative measures of communal service administrative include number of highway miles and
square footage of green space. Unfortunately, these data are not readily available for U.S. munici-
palities.
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crimes to include murders and non-negligent manslaughter, legacy rape, revised rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault. Total property (i.e., “non-violent”) crimes include
o↵enses such as burglary, larceny, and motor-vehicle theft. The total crime rate
includes both total violent as well as total property crimes. We employ the reciprocal
of the total crime rate so that our measure of safety, Y3, increases as crime decreases.
We use total land area (in square miles), Y4, as a measure of public services
provided, following Grossman et al. (1999), obtained from the U.S. Census of Gov-
ernments. Larger land areas require more infrastructure and public good servicing,
such as highway repair and sewerage connections. The total number of unit-level
building permits issued in a given year, Y5, provides a measure of the amount of
administrative services provided.10 Data on building permits are obtained from the
Annual U.S. Building and Permit Survey and are summed over months to obtain
annual figures. Finally, data on the annual employment rate, Y6, are obtained from
the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics. All of our data are at the level of
municipal governments in a given year.11 After eliminating observations with missing
values for one or more of our variables, we have 649, 730, 746 and 800 observations
for 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012 (respectively), for a total of 2,925 observations.
We assume that all municipalities operate in the same production set  defined
by (1.1), and consequently face the same frontier  @ in the seven-dimensional input-
output space. Note, however, that local governments may have very di↵erent scales
and budget plans, and hence may operate in di↵erent regions of the production set or
under di↵erent parts of the frontier. The model described in Section 2.1 is fully non-
parametric, and hence quite flexible. The assumptions listed in Section 2.1 impose
10We use the number of permits issued for individual units, rather than number of buildings for
which permits have been issued. In dense urban environments, one might observe multiple units
(e.g., condominium units) in a single building for which building permits have been issued.
11We use the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of local government, corresponding to type code 2
in the U.S. Census of Governments’ 14-digit government ID code.
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only minimal restrictions involving free-disposability, continuity and some smoothness
of the frontier. Note that there is no assumption of convexity of  , which we test
below in Section 2.3.
Although our non-parametric model is highly flexible, there is a price to pay in
terms of the well-known “curse of dimensionality.” Wilson (2018) discusses dimension-
reduction in the context of nonparametric e ciency estimation, and presents diag-
nostics to indicate whether reducing dimensionality might be advantageous. As dis-
cussed in Section 2.1, the FDH, VRS and CRS estimators converge at rate n, where
 = 1/(p + q) for FDH estimators,  = 2/(p + q + 1) for VRS estimators and
 = 2/(p + q) for CRS estimators. With the (p + q) = 7 dimensional specification
described above, the convergence rates are n1/7, n1/4 and n2/7 for FDH, VRS and
CRS estimators, respectively. Moreover, as noted above, the number of observations
in each period range from 649 to 800. The e↵ective parametric sample size defined
by Wilson (2018) is then, in the worst case, 6491/7 ⇡ 6 for FDH estimators, 6491/4 ⇡
25 for VRS estimators and 6492/7 ⇡ 40 for VRS estimators. In other words, with a
sample size of 649, FDH estimators should be expected to result in estimation error
of the same order one would achieve with a typical parametric estimator (converging
at the root-n rate) and only 6 observations. With VRS (or CRS) estimators, one
should expect estimation error of the same order that 25 (or 40) observations would
provide in a parametric model. Of course, consistency of the VRS estimators requires
convexity of  , and consistency of the CRS estimators requires in addition CRS. It
remains to be seen whether  satisfies such restrictions.12
Wilson (2018) also suggests examining the ratio Ry of the largest eigenvalue of
12Of course, the notion of e↵ective parametric sample size defined by Wilson (2018) presupposes
that one has a correctly specified parametric model. As Robinson (1988) notes, the root-n parametric
convergence rate means that estimators converge quickly to the wrong thing in a mis-specified model;
Robinson-1988 refers to this as root-n inconsistency.
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the moment matrix Y Y 0 to the sum of eigenvalues for Y Y 0. moment matrices. Our
data yield values 99.38, 99.75, 99.86 and 99.64 for Ry in 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012. If
one considers a set of rays from the origin passing through each observation in the six-
dimensional output space R6+ for each year, the values of Ry indicate that these rays
lie in a very tight bundle and are very similar in terms of their angles with respect to
each axis. The results also indicate that the data contain almost no information about
marginal rates of transformation between outputs. The smallest of these values, 99.38,
is well above the level needed for dimension reduction to likely reduce mean square
error of either DEA or FDH estimates as indicated by the simulation results reported
by Wilson (2018). Consequently, we compute the (1⇥n) principal component vector
Y⇤ = E 0yY where Ey is the (q⇥1) eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalues
of the moment matrix Y Y 0. Given the values for Ry listed above, it is clear that these
principle components contain almost all of the independent information in the q = 6
outputs specified above. Except as noted below, all estimation is done using the single
input variable X and the (output) principal component Y⇤. In this two-dimensional
setting, the convergence rates of the FDH, VRS and CRS estimators are n1/2, n2/3
and n1, respectively. The simulation results of Wilson (2018) provide clear evidence
that relying only on X and Y⇤ for estimation likely results in less estimation error
than would be the case with five dimensions. This is true regardless of whether the
technology is homothetic, contrary to what is suggested by Färe and Lovell (1988)
and Olesen and Petersen (2016).
Summary statistics for our input and output variables as well as the principal
component Y⇤ are shown in Table 2.1. For each variable, the table shows the minimum
value, first quartile (Q1), median, mean, third quartile (Q3) and the maximum value.
The wide range of city sizes and our use of data spanning 15 years results in substantial
variation in each of the variables as reflected in the table. Comparing di↵erences
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between the median and Q1 and between Q3 and the median for the input and
output variables reveals that the marginal distributions are skewed to the right.
2.3 Empirical Results
As a preliminary step, we further investigate the e cacy of dimension reduc-
tion, we first estimate the hyperbolic e ciency in (1.5) for municipalities in each year
using the full-dimensional data with one input and six outputs. We then repeat this
exercise using the input variable X and the reduced-dimensional output variable Y⇤.
In both cases, we obtain estimates from the FDH, VRS and CRS estimators described
above in Section 2.1. Table 2.2 shows the number of observations in each year as well
as counts of the number of estimates equal to one in each of the resulting six scenarios.
As discussed by Wilson (2018), large proportions of e ciency estimates equal to one,
especially among FDH estimates, may indicate the need for dimension reduction.
Each of the FDH, VRS and CRS estimators are biased, but the bias is largest
for the FDH estimator, and smallest for the CRS estimator. The counts in Table 2.2
where the full data are used reveal that about half of the FDH estimates are equal
to one in each year. By contrast, a much smaller proportion of the VRS estimates
equal one, and less than 1.5 percent of the CRS estimates are equal to one in each
year. Taken together, the results indicate that most of the ine ciency that one would
find using either the VRS or CRS estimators is merely an artifact of the convexity
imposed by both estimators, and in addition the assumption of CRS imposed by the
CRS estimator. As such, the estimates in Table 2.2 obtained with the full data, in
particular the large proportion of estimates equal to one when the FDH estimator
is used, make clear the need for dimension reduction. The evidence is clear that
there are too many dimensions for the sample size (see Wilson, 2018 for discussion).
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Furthermore, the di↵erences in proportions obtained with the FDH estimator and
those obtained with the VRS estimator suggest that  may not be convex. This is
investigated further below.
Table 2.2 also shows counts of the numbers of observations with e ciency
estimates equal to one when the reduced-dimensional data are used. In the last three
columns of Table 2.2, the counts for the FDH estimator are larger than the counts for
the VRS estimator, which in turn are larger than the counts for the CRS estimator.
This is to be expected since the bias decreases as one moves from the FDH to the
VRS and then the CRS estimators. However, the counts for the FDH estimator with
the reduced-dimensional data amount to about 10 percent of the counts for the FDH
estimator with the full data. Overall, the results in Table 2.2 provide evidence (in
addition to the values of Ry and the e↵ective parametric sample sizes discussed earlier
in Section 2.2) that dimension reduction likely reduces estimation error relative to
what would be obtained working in the full, seven-dimensional space. Consequently,
we employ dimension reduction and work in the two-dimensional space of the variables
X and Y⇤ for the remainder of the paper.
Having specified the fully nonparametric model presented in Section 2.1, we
are confronted with three di↵erent estimators. In terms of restrictiveness, the FDH
estimator is the least restrictive, followed by the VRS estimator which imposes con-
vexity of the production set  , and finally by the CRS estimator which imposes CRS
in addition to convexity. Moreover, there is a tradeo↵ between the rate of conver-
gence and the restrictiveness of the estimators; i.e., the FDH estimator converges
slower than the other two, while the CRS estimator has the fastest rate.13 In many
applied studies in the literature, the choice between FDH, VRS and CRS estimators
13If CRS holds, then the VRS estimator attains the faster rate of the CRS estimator, i.e., n with
 = 2/(p+ q) as proved by Kneip et al. (2016).
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often appears to be made arbitrarily, or worse, perhaps to avoid excessive numbers
of estimates equal to one. As the results for the full data (or even for the reduced
data) in Table 2.2 indicate, the VRS and CRS estimators produce substantially fewer
estimates equal to one than the FDH estimator. One might suspect that this ex-
plains why the VRS and CRS estimators are used with much greater frequency than
the FDH estimator. However, whether the VRS estimator is appropriate depends on
whether the production set is convex. If  is convex, whether the CRS estimator is
appropriate depends further on whether CRS holds.
To decide whether the FDH or VRS estimator should be used, we first test
the null hypothesis of convexity of  versus the alternative hypothesis that  is not
convex. We use the test developed by Kneip et al. (2016), augmented by results from
Simar and Wilson (2019). The test described by Kneip et al. (2016) involves randomly
splitting the sample for a given year into two independent subsamples of sizes n1 and
n2 = n   n1 and comparing the sample mean of VRS e ciency estimates from the
first subsample with n1 observations and the sample mean of FDH e ciency estimates
from the second subsample with n2 observations. The null hypothesis of convexity is
rejected when the di↵erence between the two sample means is “large.” The subsample
sizes are chosen by setting en2/(p+q+1)1 = en
1/(p+q)
2 and en1 + en2 = n, solving for en1, and
then setting n1 = ben1e and n2 = n   n1, where bae denotes rounding of a 2 R to
the closest integer. The first subsample is used to compute VRS estimates, and the
second is used to compute FDH estimates. The test statistic given in equation (50) of
Kneip et al. (2016) involves the di↵erence of the means of these two sets of estimates,
with generalized jackknife estimates of biases and corresponding sample variances,
and is asymptotically normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance. The
test is a one-sided test since under the null the two means should be roughly similar,
but the statistic should diverge from N(0, 1) with increasing departures from the
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null resulting in the mean of the FDH estimates exceeding the mean of the VRS
estimates. The statistic given in equation (50) of Kneip et al. (2016) is defined in
terms of input-oriented estimators, but the asymptotic normality result obtained by
Kneip et al. (2016) extends trivially to output-oriented and hyperbolic estimators. In
each case, statistics are defined so that “large” positive values indicate rejection of
the null hypothesis.
Splitting the sample is necessary to maintain independence between the means
of the FDH and VRS estimates as explained by Kneip et al. (2016). Although the
test is valid for a single, random split, one may obtain di↵erent results by splitting
the sample di↵erently. In fact, under the null the test statistics are asymptotically
distributed N(0, 1), and hence by the probability integral transform, the correspond-
ing p-values (which are also random variables) are distributed uniformly on the (0, 1)
interval. If one had m samples, each could be randomly split, then m test statistics
and corresponding p-values could be computed, one for each sample. One could then
use the sample mean of the test statistics, which under the null would be asymptot-
ically distributed N(0,m 1). Alternatively, one could use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
one-sample test to test whether the resulting p-values are uniformly distributed; if
not, one should reject the null hypothesis of convexity of  .
Given a single sample, splitting repeatedly results in dependence from one
split to the next. Hence the limiting distribution of the sample mean of test statistics
from m splits of a single sample is unknown. For the same reason, the usual tables
for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic are invalid and should not be used. Simar
and Wilson (2019) develop a bootstrap method for estimating (i) p-values for tests
based on either sample means of test statistics across m splits of a given sample (test
#1), and (ii) the sampling distribution of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for the
m p-values obtained from m splits of the same sample, permitting inference about
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convexity while removing the arbitrariness of a single random split of the sample.
Simulation results provided by Simar and Wilson (2019) indicate that the proposed
bootstrap method results in tests with good size and power properties.
For each of the four years covered by our data, we test convexity versus non-
convexity of  using the Kneip et al. (2016) test with 1,000 sample-splits and the
bootstrap proposed by Simar and Wilson (2019) with 1,000 bootstrap replications.
For each year we conduct three tests, using input-oriented, output-oriented, and hy-
perbolic FDH and VRS estimators. The resulting values of test statistics and p-values
are shown in Table 2.3. Using the input-oriented or hyperbolic estimators, the largest
p-value is 0.007. Using output-oriented estimators, convexity is not rejected using
test #1 based on the sample mean of the Kneip et al. (2016) statistic over 1,000
sample-splits, nor is convexity rejected for 1997 and 2002 using test #2 based on the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. But overall, the data provide ample evidence against
convexity of  , and consequently we rely on FDH estimators for the remainder of
our analysis since both the VRS and CRS estimators require convexity for statistical
consistency, whereas the FDH estimators do not require convexity.14
Table 2.4 reports summary statistics for FDH e ciency estimates in each year
for each orientation (i.e., input, output and hyperbolic). To facilitate comparison, we
report statistics on reciprocals of the output-oriented estimates, so that in each case
larger values correspond with greater e ciency (i.e., less ine ciency). As discussed
by Wilson (2011), the levels of ine ciency in the input and output orientations may
di↵er due to curvature of the frontier  @ and where municipalities lie in the input-
output space. This is apparent from the results in the first two panels of Table 2.4,
where it is evident that the distribution of output-oriented estimates (after taking
14The simulation results of Wilson (2018) indicate that the FDH estimator often yields smaller
mean square error than the VRS estimator after dimension reduction, even if the underlying pro-
duction set is convex.
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reciprocals) lies to the right of the distribution of the input-oriented estimates. Wilson
(2011) also discusses how the hyperbolic measure of e ciency represents a compromise
between the input and output orientations, and is less sensitive to curvature of the
frontier. The results in Table 2.4 reveal that mean estimated e ciency is higher for
the hyperbolic estimates than for either the input- or output-oriented estimates.
Regardless of the direction in which e ciency is measured, the overall, qual-
itative results in Table 2.4 are similar across the three orientations. Each of the
three sets of estimates suggest that technical e ciency declined from 1997 to 2012.
The input-oriented estimates show a tiny increase in mean estimated e ciency from
2002 to 2007, and the hyperbolic estimates show no change from 2002 to 2007, but
otherwise, mean estimated e ciency declines from one period to the next in Table
2.4.
To examine whether these changes are statistically significant, we use the
test described by Kneip et al. (2016, Section 3.1.1) to test for significant di↵erences
between the means reported in Table 2.4 from one period to the next. This test
permits the frontier to either be the same or to be di↵erent across periods, and does
not require random splitting of the sample as with the convexity test described above
since the data naturally fall into two groups. Even with reduced dimensionality, the
usual CLT results (e.g., the Lindeberg-Feller CLT) do not hold for means of the FDH
e ciency estimates as discussed in Kneip et al. (2015, 2016). As with the convexity
test discussed above, the test statistic given by equation (18) of Kneip et al. (2016)
involves not only the di↵erence in sample means of e ciency estimates in a pair
of years, but also the corresponding di↵erence in generalized jackknife estimates of
bias. The test extends trivially to the output-orientation, and due to Theorem 3.1
of Wilson (2019), it also extends easily to the hyperbolic orientation. The results
in Table 2.5 indicate that the test soundly rejects the null hypothesis of no change
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in mean e ciency in every case. For 1997–2002, 2002–2007 and 1997–2012, the test
statistics are negative, indicating declines in mean e ciency. However, for 2007–2012
the test statistics are positive, indicating that mean e ciency increased after 2007.
This is in contrast to the means reported earlier in Table 2.4 where the sample means
of e ciency estimates decline from 2007 to 2012. But as the results of Kneip et al.
(2015) make clear, sample means of FDH e ciency estimates involve bias, which is
ignored in Table 2.4 but is accounted for in Table 2.5. Overall, the results in Table
2.5 indicate that mean e ciency declined from 1997 to 2007, and although there was
improvement from 2007 to 2012, mean e ciency declined on net between 1997 and
2012.
Due to the regional heterogeneity among state and local governments, it is
important to consider possible di↵erences in mean e ciencies across regions. We
divide municipal governments represented in our sample into the four regions defined
by the U.S. Census Bureau: Northeast (1), Midwest (2), South (3), the West (4).
These census regions are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Then for each of the four census
regions, we test for di↵erences in mean e ciency across pairs of years, analogous to
the previous tests using the entire sample and ignoring regions. Results of these tests
are reported in Table 2.6. While the results in Table 2.5 indicate decreases in mean
e ciency from 1997 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2007, the results in Table 2.6 reveal
that these results were not uniform over the di↵erent regions. The results in Table
2.6 indicate that mean e ciency increased over these periods in the Northeast, while
in the Midwest and South, there is scant evidence of any change. In the west, mean
e ciency decreased over each pair of years. For 2007 to 2012, the results suggest
e ciency improved in the Northeast and South, but declined in the Midwest and
West.
The results presented so far suggest changes in mean e ciency over time, and
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that these changes were not uniform over regions. To gain further insight, we examine
pairs of years 1997–2002, 2002–2007, and 2007–2012 and apply the test of “separa-
bility” developed by Daraio et al. (2018), treating time as a binary “environmental”
variable. The separability test in this case amounts to a test of whether time a↵ects
the frontier, i.e., whether the frontier shifts over time. The test requires splitting the
randomly sorted, pooled sample of observations for each of two years, into two sub-
samples of sizes n1 = bn/2c and n2 = n   n1, where bac denotes the largest integer
not greater than a 2 R. Then mean e ciency estimates from the first subsample
are compared with means of e ciency estimates from the second subsample, but in
the second subsample, e ciency is estimated separately for each of the two years, in
e↵ect conditioning on time. Generalized jackknife estimates corresponding to each of
the three sets of e ciency estimates are also computed. See Daraio et al. (2018) for
details.
As with the convexity tests described above, the random splitting of the sam-
ple into two independent groups introduces noise and ambiguity, which can be re-
moved using the bootstrap method of Simar and Wilson (2019) as discussed above
in connection with the test for convexity of the production set. We again use 1,000
sample-splits, and 1,000 bootstrap replications. Results of the tests are shown in
Table 2.7. The largest p-value (0.011) occurs with test #2 based on the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic. The data strongly reject separability with respect to time. Taken
together with the results in Table 2.5, it is evident that while mean e ciency changed
over time, the frontier also changed over time.
Table 2.8 presents results for similar tests of separability with respect to region
for each of the four years represented in our sample. Here again, the data for a
given year must be split into two subsamples of equal size. E ciency is estimated
over all observations in the first subsample, and independently over observations for
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each region in the second subsample. Then the mean of the unconditional estimates
in the first subsample is compared with the mean of the conditional (on regions)
estimates from the second subsample while accounting for bias using generalized
jackknife estimates of bias. Again, see Daraio et al. (2018) for details. The bootstrap
method of Simar and Wilson (2019) is used again, with 1,000 sample-splits and 1,000
bootstrap replications. We report results in Table 2.8 for tests based on sample
means of test statistics across the 1,000 sample-splits (test #1) and tests based on
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for the p-values corresponding to each of the 1,000
sample-splits (test #2). The largest p-value in Table 2.8 is 0.023, and all others are
smaller than 0.000. Consequently, the data provide clear evidence against separability
(i.e., a common frontier) across census regions.15
Having rejected a common frontier across regions in each year, we report in
Table 2.9 sample means of hyperbolic FDH e ciency estimates by region and by year
in order to provide an idea of the levels of ine ciency in each region and each year.16
However, any comparisons of mean e ciency across years within a region should be
made in conjunction with the results reported earlier in Table 2.6. These results,
combined with those from the separability tests, suggest that municipalities in the
di↵erent regions face di↵erent operating environments and constraints. The West
region, in particular, has been the home of a number of large bankruptcies, including
Stockton, CA and San Bernardino, CA.
15Clearly, one should not estimate e ciency over all municipalities in a given year, and then regress
the e ciency estimates on dummy variables for the various regions and perhaps other environmental
variables for the reasons given by Simar and Wilson (2007, 2011).
16Results for input- and output-oriented FDH e ciency estimates are similar qualitatively, but
are omitted here to conserve space. The additional results are available from the authors on request.
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2.4 Summary and Conclusions
Previous literature examining the municipal e ciency have failed to test for
the convexity of  , with the vast majority using VRS, DEA estimators. By testing
for convexity versus non-convexity, we are able to let the data drive the choice of
appropriate estimator. Our results suggest that  is indeed non-convex in every year
of our sample. Additionally, this is the first paper employing a fully nonparametric
framework to gain insight on regional e ciency of U.S. municipalities. Since our re-
sults strongly rejected convexity, we estimated e ciency using FDH estimators, which
are e cient in either case. To gain further insight, we also examine the technology
and productivity of local governments. Since this is the first paper to test for this,
we are unable to compare out results directly, but we are confident our results pro-
vide insight into e ciency of local governments and contributes significantly to the
existing literature.
As previously described, by exploiting collinearity in the data to reduce dimen-
sions to their first principle components, we went from a seven-dimensional problem
to a two-dimensional problem. Results from Wilson (2018) indicate that this substan-
tially reduces mean square error of e ciency estimators. Moreover, the simulation
evidence provided by Wilson (2018) suggests that when production sets are convex,
FDH estimates often have less mean square error than DEA estimators after dimen-
sion reduction.
Our results suggest that municipalities’ technology varied both by year and re-
gion. By testing di↵erences across years and regions, the results suggest that technical
e ciency declined in 2007 in both the South and West region during the financial cri-
sis, and has not recovered completely across all cases. Comparatively, the Northeast
did not see any changes in mean e ciency as a result of the financial crisis. Notably,
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the Midwest and South saw the largest decline in mean e ciency from 2002–2007.
These results have significant implications in regards to e ciency of spending and






























































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: Numbers of Observations With Estimated Hyperbolic Technical E ciency
Equal to 1 in Each Year
Without With
Dimension Dimension
— Reduction — — Reduction —
Year n FDH VRS CRS FDH VRS CRS
1997 649 338 43 9 42 7 1
2002 730 355 39 6 35 8 1
2007 746 358 38 9 29 6 1
2012 800 373 36 7 33 6 1
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Table 2.3: Results of Convexity Tests (with Dimension Reduction, 1,000 Splits, 1,000
Bootstrap Replications; p = q = 1)
— Input — — Output — — Hyperbolic —
Year Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Test #1:
1997 3.566 0.000 0.653 0.167 1.175 0.003
2002 3.772 0.000 0.683 0.118 1.277 0.005
2007 2.116 0.005 1.141 0.795 3.660 0.000
2012 3.022 0.000 1.222 0.898 4.167 0.000
Test #2:
1997 0.583 0.000 0.297 0.295 0.529 0.001
2002 0.685 0.000 0.321 0.120 0.469 0.007
2007 0.674 0.000 0.521 0.004 0.751 0.000
2012 0.738 0.000 0.584 0.000 0.817 0.000
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics for FDH Technical E ciency Estimates (with Dimen-
sion Reduction, p = q = 1)
Year Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max Var
— Input Orientation —
1997 0.044 0.206 0.331 0.416 0.597 1.000 0.075
2002 0.024 0.174 0.282 0.374 0.505 1.000 0.070
2007 0.036 0.194 0.310 0.379 0.506 1.000 0.062
2012 0.032 0.190 0.287 0.366 0.458 1.000 0.062
— Output Orientation —
1997 0.182 0.457 0.590 0.609 0.751 1.000 0.041
2002 0.135 0.442 0.567 0.587 0.726 1.000 0.040
2007 0.138 0.421 0.519 0.556 0.687 1.000 0.039
2012 0.119 0.387 0.501 0.540 0.674 1.000 0.042
— Hyperbolic Orientation —
1997 0.346 0.587 0.705 0.714 0.826 1.000 0.025
2002 0.301 0.575 0.665 0.690 0.811 1.000 0.025
2007 0.259 0.523 0.640 0.660 0.784 1.000 0.028
2012 0.221 0.505 0.623 0.647 0.777 1.000 0.031
NOTE: Statistics for the reciprocals of the output e ciency estimates are given to
facilitate comparison with the input-oriented and hyperbolic estimates.
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Table 2.5: Tests for Di↵erences in Mean E ciency across Periods (FDH with Dimen-
sion Reduction; p = q = 1)
— Input — — Output — — Hyperbolic —
Period Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
1997–2002  17.955 4.372 ⇥10 72  7.250 4.172 ⇥10 13  13.086 3.980 ⇥10 39
2002–2007  12.014 3.010 ⇥10 33  6.933 4.121 ⇥10 12  11.951 6.393 ⇥10 33
2007–2012 4.662 3.136 ⇥10 06 7.407 1.288 ⇥10 13 10.996 3.991 ⇥10 28
1997–2012  15.482 4.598 ⇥10 54  12.823 1.213 ⇥10 37  18.528 1.235 ⇥10 76
76
Table 2.6: Tests of Di↵erences in Mean E ciency between Years, by U.S. Census
Region (FDH with Dimension Reduction; p = q = 1)
— Input — — Output — — Hyperbolic —
Period Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
— Region 1: Northeast —
1997–2002 4.947 7.529 ⇥10 07 6.795 1.080 ⇥10 11 3.586 3.353 ⇥10 04
2002–2007 2.597 9.412 ⇥10 03 6.685 2.311 ⇥10 11 4.859 1.181 ⇥10 06
2007–2012  0.745 4.565 ⇥10 01  5.259 1.446 ⇥10 07  1.253 2.104 ⇥10 01
1997–2012 7.464 8.389 ⇥10 14 1.160 2.461 ⇥10 01 3.926 8.625 ⇥10 05
— Region 2: Midwest —
1997–2002  0.554 5.795 ⇥10 01  0.962 3.363 ⇥10 01  0.159 8.735 ⇥10 01
2002–2007 0.579 5.623 ⇥10 01 0.512 6.088 ⇥10 01 0.296 7.675 ⇥10 01
2007–2012  3.874 1.071 ⇥10 04  5.038 4.697 ⇥10 07  3.390 6.995 ⇥10 04
1997–2012  6.167 6.976 ⇥10 10  4.385 1.160 ⇥10 05  3.756 1.724 ⇥10 04
— Region 3: South —
1997–2002  2.672 7.533 ⇥10 03  0.446 6.557 ⇥10 01  0.832 4.055 ⇥10 01
2002–2007 0.558 5.766 ⇥10 01 0.039 9.688 ⇥10 01 0.177 8.592 ⇥10 01
2007–2012 3.023 2.499 ⇥10 03 0.418 6.761 ⇥10 01 2.036 4.175 ⇥10 02
1997–2012  2.746 6.039 ⇥10 03  0.676 4.990 ⇥10 01  1.161 2.455 ⇥10 01
— Region 4: West —
1997–2002  5.904 3.547 ⇥10 09  2.964 3.033 ⇥10 03  4.026 5.665 ⇥10 05
2002–2007  7.129 1.012 ⇥10 12  4.688 2.760 ⇥10 06  8.842 9.376 ⇥10 19
2007–2012  4.577 4.712 ⇥10 06  6.798 1.058 ⇥10 11  7.289 3.112 ⇥10 13
1997–2012  0.498 6.185 ⇥10 01  3.438 5.861 ⇥10 04  3.305 9.514 ⇥10 04
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Table 2.7: Test for Separability with Respect to Time (FDH with Dimension Reduc-
tion, 1,000 Splits, 1,000 Bootstrap Replications; p = q = 1)
— Input — — Output — — Hyperbolic —
Period Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Test #1:
1997–2002 2.752 0.000 16.912 0.000 7.743 0.000
2002–2007 2.496 0.000 7.298 0.000 4.561 0.000
2007–2012 2.674 0.000 16.328 0.000 7.513 0.000
1997–2012 1.792 0.000 8.451 0.000 4.730 0.000
Test #2:
1997–2002 0.598 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.983 0.000
2002–2007 0.528 0.000 0.917 0.000 0.748 0.011
2007–2012 0.571 0.000 0.998 0.000 0.820 0.000
1997–2012 0.489 0.000 0.940 0.000 0.739 0.010
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Table 2.8: Tests for Separability with Respect to U.S. Census Region (FDH with
Dimension Reduction, 1,000 Splits, 1,000 Bootstrap Replications; p = q = 1)
— Input — — Output — — Hyperbolic —
Period Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Test #1:
1997 2.716 0.000 7.805 0.000 4.119 0.000
2002 3.761 0.000 8.457 0.000 4.960 0.000
2007 3.636 0.000 10.790 0.000 5.982 0.000
2012 4.287 0.000 12.169 0.000 6.844 0.000
Test #2:
1997 0.649 0.000 0.985 0.000 0.905 0.023
2002 0.780 0.000 0.993 0.000 0.956 0.000
2007 0.755 0.000 0.993 0.000 0.947 0.000
2012 0.885 0.000 0.998 0.000 0.984 0.000
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Table 2.9: Summary Statistics for Hyperbolic FDH Technical E ciency Estimates by
U.S. Census Region (with Dimension Reduction; p = q = 1)
Year Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max Var
— Region 1: Northeast —
1997 0.501 0.644 0.735 0.753 0.867 1.000 0.022
2002 0.494 0.646 0.762 0.771 0.906 1.000 0.023
2007 0.479 0.684 0.784 0.792 0.918 1.000 0.023
2012 0.525 0.722 0.817 0.826 0.946 1.000 0.016
— Region 2: Midwest —
1997 0.545 0.745 0.868 0.856 1.000 1.000 0.017
2002 0.488 0.739 0.841 0.841 0.957 1.000 0.015
2007 0.462 0.779 0.866 0.853 0.952 1.000 0.014
2012 0.406 0.743 0.835 0.824 0.921 1.000 0.016
— Region 3: South —
1997 0.357 0.679 0.826 0.796 0.917 1.000 0.024
2002 0.328 0.658 0.800 0.779 0.896 1.000 0.024
2007 0.293 0.665 0.804 0.780 0.909 1.000 0.026
2012 0.335 0.660 0.813 0.779 0.901 1.000 0.025
— Region 4: West —
1997 0.452 0.653 0.756 0.769 0.907 1.000 0.024
2002 0.381 0.624 0.728 0.743 0.880 1.000 0.025
2007 0.391 0.578 0.716 0.718 0.856 1.000 0.029
2012 0.372 0.577 0.725 0.727 0.878 1.000 0.033
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Table 2.10: Summary Statistics for Productivity Estimates by U.S. Census Region
(with Dimension Reduction; p = q = 1)
Year Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max
— Region 1: Northeast —
1997 3.476 7.031 10.051 12.585 14.396 53.726
2002 2.580 3.913 5.115 7.080 9.987 24.482
2007 1.672 3.193 4.260 7.179 7.599 139.665
2012 2.611 4.926 6.227 7.644 10.286 18.529
— Region 2: Midwest —
1997 7.039 16.750 24.314 29.843 32.474 381.186
2002 3.097 11.173 13.757 16.226 17.607 222.833
2007 2.641 8.230 10.012 11.791 12.840 120.193
2012 4.087 12.291 15.175 16.702 18.513 154.299
— Region 3: South —
1997 4.321 13.187 20.198 21.429 27.596 72.887
2002 1.979 8.033 12.528 13.117 15.999 46.587
2007 1.719 5.583 8.979 9.689 12.593 32.663
2012 1.827 8.379 14.012 14.363 18.366 87.970
— Region 4: West —
1997 5.494 17.880 22.773 26.086 29.540 138.376
2002 1.536 10.752 14.647 17.301 19.287 100.864
2007 1.400 8.031 9.887 11.951 14.027 60.908
2012 2.538 12.562 16.545 18.662 20.973 91.286
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Table 2.11: Tests of Di↵erences in Means for Productivity Estimates by U.S. Census
Region and Years (with Dimension Reduction; p = q = 1)
— Productivity —
Period Statistic p-value
— Region 1: Northeast —
1997–2002  6.984 2.862 ⇥10 12
2002–2007 0.053 9.574 ⇥10 01
2007–2012 0.254 7.991 ⇥10 01
1997–2012  5.712 1.115 ⇥10 08
— Region 2: Midwest —
1997–2002  3.729 1.924 ⇥10 04
2002–2007  4.441 8.954 ⇥10 06
2007–2012 6.517 7.167 ⇥10 11
1997–2012  3.763 1.678 ⇥10 04
— Region 3: South —
1997–2002  13.408 5.421⇥ 10 41
2002–2007  12.761 2.706 ⇥10 37
2007–2012 15.093 1.795 ⇥10 51
1997–2012  10.132 4.001 ⇥10 24
— Region 4: West —
1997–2002  12.276 1.222 ⇥10 34
2002–2007  7.851 4.130 ⇥10 15
2007–2012 14.918 2.523 ⇥10 50
1997–2012  6.737 1.611 ⇥10 11
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Figure 2.1: Census Regions of the United States
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Chapter 3
The E↵ect of Proposition G on
Housing Quality and Tenant
Filtering in San Francisco
3.1 Introduction
Finding rental housing in San Francisco can be a challenge. Due in part to
supply constraints and increased demand for rental housing, renters face a limited
stock of a↵ordable units. According to Rent Jungle, as of January 2018 the average
rent for a one bedroom apartment in San Francisco was over $3,400 a month and
nearly $4,500 for a two bedroom unit. The city has attempted to deal with the issue of
housing adequacy and a↵ordability since the late 1970s when it initially implemented
rent control policies. Since San Francisco does not track the housing stock over time,
the total number of controlled units is unknown. In 2014, urban research group Spur
estimated there are approximately 172,000 controlled units in San Francisco. This
constitutes nearly 72 percent of the total stock of rental housing and would suggest
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that rent control coverage is extensive.
With citywide rising rents, landlords of rent-controlled buildings face increas-
ing incentives to evade the rent control ordinance. In the 1990s these e↵orts led
to frequent exploitation of loopholes in the laws, often by way of owner move-in
(OMI) evictions and subsequent condo conversions of units in controlled buildings
via tenancies-in-common. The city has attempted to deal with speculative behav-
ior on the part of landlords and other third parties by passing regulations, notably
Proposition G. San Francisco passed Proposition G in 1998 in an e↵ort to stymie the
exploitation of these loopholes by increasing the costs associated with the use of these
no-fault evictions to landlords and also restricting their usage in controlled buildings.
The goal of Proposition G was to prevent further reduction in the controlled stock
and protect tenants currently residing in these buildings.
This paper analyzes the e↵ect of Proposition G on rental housing quality in San
Francisco. While the regulation was passed in an e↵ort to protect tenants residing
in controlled buildings and to preserve the existing stock of a↵ordable housing, it
may have resulted in unintended e↵ects. Following the regulation, landlords faced
higher opportunity costs of providing rent-controlled housing and greater restrictions
on their ability to exit the controlled market. I expect this policy to have the e↵ect
of decreasing housing quality as landlord behavior is constrained, resulting in lower
building and maintenance expenditures. Additionally, I expect that increased tenant
protection from eviction will slow the rate of downward filtering which occurs as a
result of the aging of the stock of housing and rental property turnover.
Theory suggests that rent control policies are likely to result in one or both
of the following: lower rental unit quality or a change in the contractual agreement
between landlords and tenants. While the empirical literature is mixed, there is an
obvious disincentive for a landlord to maintain the unit if a binding price ceiling exists.
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To get around these caps, landlords may have prospective renters bid (“key money”)
on the unit in an attempt to recoup the losses su↵ered from the rent control mandates.
Cheung (1975) looks at the unintended consequences following the 1921 Rent Control
Ordinance in Hong Kong. While the legislative intent of the bill was to control
the existing rents and to encourage construction on unoccupied land, he notes that
landlords will evict their tenants so long as the expected profits from reconstruction
exceed the rental stream that can be obtained from the prospective tenant. The
empirical evidence suggests that this ordinance encouraged reconstruction as a means
to escape the rent control mandates.
Cheung (1979) examines the e↵ects of rent control on housing reconstruction
in Hong Kong. When landlords were only permitted to evict tenants for the purpose
of reconstruction, this had an unintended e↵ect of causing frequent demolition of
both old and new buildings alike. Through demolition and reconstruction, they were
able to circumvent the rent control ordinance in Hong Kong. These findings highlight
the issue with rent control regulation and the unintended e↵ects it can have. This
behavior leads to considerable waste and is an ine cient use of resources. Landlords
of controlled buildings in San Francisco and other markets with rent control likely
face similar incentives in regards to demolition and reconstruction. Proposition G
aimed to make this practice more di cult in San Francisco by imposing higher costs
on this behavior. In addition to its unintended e↵ects, rent control also may impact
the allocation of resources. Olsen (1972) finds that occupants of New York City
rent-controlled housing consume around four percent less housing services than they
would have in the absence of rent controls. He also finds that poorer families received
larger benefits than richer ones. While the issue of whether rent control increases
homelessness is highly debated in the literature, Early and Olsen (1998) cannot reject
the hypothesis that rent control has no net e↵ect on homelessness.
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Additionally, theory suggests that units in controlled buildings would be of
lower average quality compared to similar units in uncontrolled buildings. This can be
attributed primarily to the di↵ering incentives faced by landlords of these respective
property types. Housing quality is di cult to observe in the data, but since the intent
of rent control is to ensure adequate and a↵ordable housing, quality is especially
relevant in this context. Mengle (1985) examines whether rent control leads to lower
quality than would have otherwise been observed. He tests whether rent control
causes landlords to reduce their maintenance expenditures and whether the e↵ects
of rent control become more pronounced over time. The results from his empirical
analysis suggest that rent control leads to lower quality units and the e↵ect tends to
worsen with age. While he uses a national sample of housing units to examine the
impact of rent control on quality, it is likely that this result also holds for smaller
markets.
Similarly, Moon and Stotsky (1993) examine the impact of rent control on
housing quality using longitudinal data from New York City. Using a nonstationary
heterogenous Markov model and a mover-stayer structure, their results provide evi-
dence that rent control does lead to a deterioration in housing quality. However, they
note that additional research is needed on this issue. Gyourko and Linneman (1990)
examine rent control and its impact on housing quality across di↵erent building sizes
in New York City. They estimate a logit model and control for observable di↵erences
in buildings including rent control status, building age, and building type (e.g. high-
rise). Their results suggest that rent control had a larger negative e↵ect on quality
for relatively smaller buildings. Unsurprisingly, the e↵ect is largest for buildings built
prior to 1947.
Rent control also has the e↵ect of slowing filtering in a city. Filtering is the idea
that as houses age, rents must decrease in order to get people to live in them. With
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rent control, landlords who are renting below market rates have no incentive to lower
the price further, even with age and wear and tear of the unit. Mills and Hamilton
(1994) note that filtering is a consequence of income growth and deterioration of
housing units over time. With rent control, it can be di cult to observe filtering as
tenants may remain at their controlled units longer than they would have otherwise.
Munch and Svarer (2002) show that tenancy mobility is severely reduced in the Danish
rent control market. Results from Diamond et al. (2019) show that expansion of rent
control policies in San Francisco led to a reduction in the supply of housing on the
behalf of landlords, thereby raising prices in the uncontrolled sector. Their findings
also suggest that rent control leads to longer tenancy duration and do not necessarily
benefit those that the rent control policies are intended for.
If downward filtering holds, wealthier households will move into the newest
housing stock and the remaining housing filters down until households with the least
means move into the second-lowest quality housing and the lowest quality housing
drops out of the stock. It is plausible that San Francisco’s housing and rent control
policies have the e↵ect of restricting tenant mobility and therefore impede downward
filtering. Rent control advocates often argue that rent control leads to a mixing
of both wealth and races, while economic theory does not necessarily support this
argument for reduced segregation. Glaeser (2002) finds that rent control in wealthier
areas has enabled poor renters to live in these cities, while declining cities in New
Jersey with rent control have increased isolation of the poor. He argues for supply-side
policies as a solution to reduce segregation as opposed to rent control mandates.
Using household-level longitudinal data from the American Housing Survey
(AHS), I utilize a stochastic rent frontier to estimate the e↵ect of unit and location-
specific attributes on annual contract rent, controlling for di↵erences in rent control
coverage. I assume that housing quality is independently distributed and a linear func-
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tion of observables, following Battese and Coelli (1995). Observables include whether
the building owner lives in the building, whether the building is rent-controlled, tenant
and household characteristics, and maintenance indicators. To estimate the causal
impact of the regulation change, I include interactions between the post-regulation
period, the presence of a live-in building owner, and the treatment group, San Fran-
cisco rent-controlled buildings. Assuming landlords are profit maximizers and are
obtaining the maximum possible rent (subject to constraints), my results suggest
that following Proposition G, owner-occupied rent-controlled buildings in San Fran-
cisco saw lower mean quality, reflecting higher post-regulation costs. Furthermore,
my findings provide evidence that rent control slows downward filtering, consistent
with findings in Diamond et al. (2019).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I provide details on rent
control in San Francisco and describe the motivation behind Proposition G and what
the regulation entails. In Section 3.3, I detail the statistical model and discuss its
advantages over the traditional hedonic approach. I detail the data in Section 3.4 and
present the findings and results in Section 3.5. Lastly, in Section 3.6, I conclude and
summarize the main findings of the paper and discuss the relevant policy implications.
3.2 Rent Control Background
Rent control arrived in San Francisco with the Rent Stabilization Ordinance in
1979 following pressure over rising housing costs from city residents. The goal of the
rent stabilization ordinance was to ensure a stock of “adequate and a↵ordable housing
for low to middle-income households.” Although adequacy is not explicitly defined,
the intent of rent control was to provide lower-cost housing options to residents in
San Francisco. One of the key provisions of the Rent Stabilization Ordinance is that
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rent control only applies to buildings built prior to June 13, 1979. There are a few
exceptions to this, and single-family homes as well as condos face limited rent control
coverage in most cases.1 Furthermore, the city expanded rent control in 1994 with
the goal of increasing the stock of controlled units to include multiunit buildings with
four or less units (“mom and pop landlords”), which were previously exempt from
the ordinance.
Landlords of controlled buildings are permitted to increase tenants’ rents an-
nually for those that choose to renew, but these increases are subject to a cap deter-
mined by the Rent Board and tied to the rate of inflation for the Bay Area. With new
tenants, landlords are permitted to set a new base rent without restrictions, although
tenants in compliance may not be denied a lease renewal. According to the San Fran-
cisco Tenants’ Union, landlords that perform maintenance or capital improvements
may pass on a portion of those costs to the tenants, but this amount is capped and
tenants are permitted to petition for exemptions if this occurs. It should be noted
that while normal annual increases in contract rent are capped, landlords are permit-
ted to increase rent following the eviction of a tenant at-fault. Once a tenant leaves
and is proven to be at-fault, the landlord is able to raise the rent to the market rate,
although the unit remains under rent control for subsequent increases.
The San Francisco Rent Board manages and oversees evictions in the city.
Evictions of tenants in both uncontrolled or controlled buildings require just-cause
on behalf of the landlord and are divided into two types: at-fault and no-fault. There
are 16 grounds for eviction in total and all eviction notices must be given to and
approved by the Rent Board before occurring. Proposition G (1998) imposed restric-
tions on the use of OMI evictions, a type of no-fault eviction. An OMI eviction occurs
1California passed the Costa Hawkins law in 1995 which set requirements for cities with rent
control. The law protects a landlord’s right to raise rents after a tenant moves and exempts units
constructed after February 1995 as well as single-family homes and condos from rent control.
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when the landlord or a close relative intends to move into the unit. Along with the
complying with the grounds for evictions, landlords utilizing these no-fault evictions
are also required to compensate tenants, as is the case with all no-fault evictions.
This amounts to roughly $5,000 per tenant, but can be up to $15,000. Furthermore,
as of 2015, following an OMI eviction, there is a five year tenancy decontrol period
in which the evicted tenant can re-rent the unit at the same rate prior to eviction
(subject to allowable increases).
Prior to the passing of Proposition G, OMI evictions were popular with land-
lords for several reasons. Under this eviction type, the owner could evict a tenant
under what e↵ectively amounts to “good faith.” This means that the Rent Board
took the landlord at their word that they or a close relative would eventually move-in
and occupy the unit. It is likely that this did not always happen and in some cases,
it is plausible that a landlord would let their building sit empty or permit unrelated
parties to occupy vacant units. Furthermore, OMI evictions enabled landlords to ex-
ploit shared ownership of buildings via tenancies-in-common. A tenancy-in-common
has multiple owners of a single building and were exempt from the condo conversion
laws.
As Capps (2014) notes, the number of OMI evictions peaked in 1998, the year
that Proposition G was passed in San Francisco. Table 3.1 lists the total OMI eviction
filings by fiscal year since the San Francisco Rent Board began tracking them. The
total number of OMI filings increased up until the regulation was passed in 1998
and then steadily declined in the years following. Prior to this binding constraint,
landlords commonly utilized OMI evictions to change the building into a tenancy-in-
common, and then proceeded towards condo conversion, contingent upon receiving
a city granted demolition permit. Proposition G most notably caps the number of
OMI evictions by landlords to one per building, as well as increases the occupancy
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and move-in requirements making it more di cult for landlords to exploit loopholes in
the law. The key amendments to the use of OMI evictions, appearing in Proposition
G, follow.
3.2.1 Proposition G (1998) Amendments
The intent of this municipal regulation was to prevent landlords from exploit-
ing loopholes in the conversion and reconstruction law. The key amendments to the
usage and implementation of OMI evictions for the city of San Francisco is as follows.
The full referendum can be found in Appendix (A).
(i) Landlords may only use one OMI eviction per building.
(ii) If a landlord intends to use an OMI eviction for a relative move-in, they must
already reside in the building.
(iii) If there is already a vacant and comparable unit in the building, the use of an
OMI eviction is limited.
(iv) Once an OMI eviction is used, the landlord or relative must move in within 3
months and continuously occupy the unit for 3 years.
(v) If the landlord uses an OMI eviction, they must o↵er the evicted tenant another
rental unit at a comparable rate.
(vi) Use of OMI evictions on senior, disabled, or terminally ill tenants is not permit-
ted.
This regulation adds to the ever-growing number of housing regulations in
the San Francisco market. By restricting the number of OMI evictions to one per
building, this regulation prevents landlords from exploiting the use of this no-fault
eviction. Furthermore, by requiring the landlord to occupy the unit continuously for
three years, this regulation forces landlords to use OMI evictions for non-speculative
92
behavior. Proposition G also increases protections for evictions of the protected
classes.2
3.3 Statistical Model
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) was simultaneously introduced by Aigner et
al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and is frequently used in many
di↵erent applications including health, finance, and agriculture. It has also been
utilized to model the production of rental housing services. Caudill (1993) uses SFA
to examine how much rents would adjust in the absence of rent control in New York
City. He asserts that the use of SFA is preferable to the traditional hedonic approach
for several reasons, primarily being that the hedonic approach implicitly assumes that
rents in the uncontrolled sector would not change upon decontrol. This is a strong
assumption and may not be realistic. He finds that rents would substantially adjust if
rent control were to be abolished, rising between 22 and 26 percent in the controlled
sector and falling between 22 and 25 percent in the uncontrolled sector.
Following the literature, I use SFA to model the production of rental housing
services and estimate the impact of Proposition G on housing quality. For a rental
unit with given observable characteristics, I define output as the maximum attain-
able annual contract rent. The inputs to annual contract rent include unit-specific
attributes, such as the number of rooms and rent control status, as well as attributes
of the surrounding area. Conditional on rent control status, I expect annual contract
rent to reflect the full consumption value of the unit. Let Rit represent the annual
2Buildings with OMI evictions face additional decontrol regulations; see the San Francisco Rent
Board for details.
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contract rent of unit i at time t
Rit = f(Xit, Zit;  1,  2)exp("it), (3.1)
where Xit is a vector of observable unit characteristics, Zit is a vector of location-
specific attributes including neighborhood e↵ects, and "it is a discount factor. Speci-
fying a log-linear production function, (3.1) can be rewritten as
logRit = Xit 1 + Zit 2 + "it
"it = vit   uit
(3.2)
where vit are identically and independently distributed normal random errors and uit
are non-negative independently distributed random errors.
I estimate a single frontier, controlling for di↵erences in rent control coverage.
My identification consists of two key assumptions. First, I assume that landlords are
profit maximizers and are therefore charging the maximum possible rent in either the
controlled or uncontrolled sector. Hence, any di↵erences in rents between two other-
wise identical units, in either the uncontrolled or controlled sector, can be attributed
to di↵erences in observable rental housing quality. When uit = 0, (3.2) defines the
maximum rent frontier and any di↵erences between rental units may be attributed to
random noise. For units that rent at a relative discount uit > 0, thereby capturing
disquality. I also assume that the AHS data are representative of the true housing
stock. Observable housing quality is estimated as
qit = exp( uit) (3.3)
which is based on its conditional expectation following Battese (1993) and Battese
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and Coelli (1995).
From (3.3), let quality be modeled as a linear function of observables
qit = Ait 1 +  2Postit +  3Treatmentit +  4Ownerit +
 5(Treatmentit ⇥ Postit) +  6(Ownerit ⇥ Postit)+
 7(Treatmentit ⇥Ownerit) +  8(Treatmentit ⇥ Postit ⇥Ownerit) + ✏it
(3.4)
where Ait is a vector of controls including unit and tenant characteristics, Post is an
indicator for the post-regulation period, Treatment is an indicator for rent-controlled
buildings in San Francisco city, Owner is an indicator for owner-occupied buildings,








 3 if Post = 0 & Owner = 0,
 3 +  5 if Post = 1 & Owner = 0,
 3 +  7 if Post = 0 & Owner = 1,
 3 +  5 +  7 +  8 if Post = 1 & Owner = 1.
Following Proposition G, I expect controlled buildings in San Francisco to be associ-
ated with lower quality, reflecting lower building maintenance and upkeep. If down-
ward filtering holds, as buildings age quality should be lower. Additionally, older
tenants and those with college education should be associated with higher quality,
whereas minority and low-income tenants should reside in units with lower associated
quality.
Before estimating a stochastic rent frontier, it is necessary to identify the
presence of uit, or technical ine ciency. Testing for the presence of uit is necessary
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because if uit = 0, then "it = vit in (3.2), which indicates a symmetric error term,
suggesting that the use of stochastic frontier is not be appropriate. To do this, a
test can be performed on the residuals from a simple ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimation, proposed by Schmidt and Lin (1984). Using the second and third sample
moment, m2 and m3, respectively, the test statistic for the presence of technical





2 ⇠ N(0, 1). (3.5)
If m3 is less than zero, this may indicate the presence of technical ine ciency. If
m3 is greater than zero, it may be an indicator of model misspecification and further
examination is necessary. The residuals show a negatively skewed distribution. This
suggests the presence of uit and the use of a stochastic frontier model is justified.
3.4 Data
Data used for estimation are obtained from the American Housing Survey
(AHS) metropolitan surveys. The AHS asks households about their housing accom-
modations, the surrounding area, as well as information regarding their household
and household composition. The data are longitudinal with households being sur-
veyed once to several times over the life of the survey. These data are presumed to
be representative of the existing stock with units being added and removed to reflect
changes over time. I utilize data from the San Francisco metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) for the following years: 1985, 1989, 1993, 1998, and 2011. These data allow
me to identify the municipality in which the rental units are located, including those
in San Francisco city. I include only renter-occupied units and omit any observa-
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tions that are government projects or that receive government subsidies. A full list
of variables and variable descriptions can be found in Table 3.2.
3.4.1 Hedonic Component
In order to estimate the hedonic pricing component, it is necessary to control
for any observables that may impact annual contract rent. These include charac-
teristics of the rental unit such as building age, number of rooms, and number of
bathrooms. Increases in the number of rooms or bathrooms is likely positively corre-
lated with unit size and hence, should result in higher rent. I account for any possible
nonlinear e↵ects by including quadratic terms for building age and number of rooms.
Additionally, I control for the presence of central heat and central air conditioning.
It is plausible that households value these attributes even with the temperate San
Francisco climate. I also account for the presence of a balcony, working fireplace, and
the existence of covered parking, all of which I expect to have a positive impact on
annual contract rent.
To control for housing an neighborhood satisfaction, I include two self-reported
measures. The AHS question asks households “On a scale from 1–10, how satisfied
are you with the housing unit?” and similarly for the neighborhood survey question.
Following the AHS question regarding rent control coverage, I include an indicator
for rent-controlled units.3 I also distinguish between building sizes. Since “mom
and pop” landlords were subject to rent control mandates in 1994, I control for the
presence of large buildings (e.g. buildings with more than four units).
In addition to observable unit characteristics, I control for neighborhood e↵ects
and other characteristics of the surrounding area. To capture di↵erences between
suburban and urban areas, I include the zone-level mean number of rooms. I expect
3AHS survey participants self-report whether there unit is rent-controlled.
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increases in the mean number of rooms to have a negative impact on contract rent
since this reflects lower land prices and likely a more suburban area. Moreover, I
control for the zone-level mean household size, mean household income, and mean
building age. Larger households are more likely to reside in relatively suburban areas
and hence, increases in this measure should be associated with lower rent. For mean
household income, the e↵ect may go either way if wealthier households choose to
locate in the city center, closer to amenities, or move outside of the city to more
suburban areas. To account for di↵erences in rent control coverage, I use the zone-
level mean building age.
3.4.2 Quality Component
To examine filtering in the quality component estimation, I control for observ-
able unit and tenant characteristics, maintenance indicators, as well as post-regulation
period and treatment group indicators and their interactions to account for the im-
pact of Proposition G on housing quality. I include a rich set of attributes concerning
the head of household including whether they are male, older (e.g. 65 years or older),
younger (e.g. less than 30 years), married, college-educated, and black. If downward
filtering holds in San Francisco, the newest housing filters down from the wealthiest
to the poorest households, until the lowest quality household falls out of the housing
stock. I expect that older households will tend to be associated with higher housing
quality and the opposite to be true for units with a younger head of household. It
is also plausible that married and college-educated tenants be associated with higher
housing quality, possibly due to having greater financial resources.
To control for other factors that may impact housing quality, I use several
di↵erent maintenance and adequacy indicators. These include whether there are
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leaks inside the unit, whether there is broken plaster, the presence of visible cracks,
and whether there has been a sewage breakdown in the last 90 days. These should
all be associated with lower quality. Additionally, the AHS provides a composite
adequacy rating which I also include. To account for di↵erences in maintenance
incentives, I control for the presence of the owner in the building. Owners that live
in their controlled building likely have greater incentive to maintain it. I also include
indicators for the post-regulation period and the treatment group, San Francisco
controlled buildings.
Table 3.3 presents selected descriptive statistics for the sample. Notably, there
is nearly a 100 year old range between the oldest and newest building in the sample,
with a minimum and maximum building age of 1919 and 2010, respectively. Nearly
40 percent of rental units reside in controlled buildings. It should be noted that this
includes controlled buildings in both San Francisco city as well as the surrounding
areas. Additionally, there is considerable variation in annual contract rent, likely
reflecting di↵erences between controlled and uncontrolled buildings, with a minimum
annual contract rent of $2,692, compared to a maximum of $34,684. The median and
mean contract rent are $11,937 and $13,041, respectively, reflecting a right-skewed
distribution.
In terms of observable unit characteristics, the median and mean number of
rooms are four and 3.83, respectively. This suggests the sample consists primarily of
smaller units, which can be expected since the San Francisco area is primarily urban.
Consistent with the number of rooms, the mean number of bedrooms and bathrooms
are around two and one, respectively. Approximately 77 percent of units reside in
large buildings, or buildings with more than four units. The average building age in
the sample is a little over 45 years old at the time of sample. Finally, 44 percent of
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buildings have an on-site building owner.4
Furthermore, there is evidence of maintenance issues in the sample. Nine
percent of rental units display visible cracks, 16 percent of units have inside leaks
of some form, and seven percent have walls with broken plaster. While there are
obvious maintenance issues, median housing and neighborhood satisfaction ratings
are relatively high, averaging an eight out of ten. Only ten percent of the sample
consists of older head of households, whereas 22 percent of the units have a younger
head of household. The majority of tenants are older than 30 and less than 65. Nine
percent of households have a black head of household, compared with 54 percent with
a male head of household. Additionally, the mean household size is around two.
3.5 Empirical Results
Results from estimation of the hedonic pricing model component are presented
in Table 3.4. In column 1, I present the results from the baseline estimation, without
including any interaction e↵ects in the quality component estimation. The majority
of coe cients have the expected signs. The coe cient on building age is negative
and significant at one percent. Similarly, the coe cient on the quadratic building
age term is positive and significant at five percent, suggesting a nonlinear e↵ect of
building age on annual contract rent. Increases in the number of rooms and bathrooms
both positively impact contract rent, consistent with initial expectations. Units with
covered parking rent for four percent more. Unsurprisingly, units with a working
fireplace and balcony rent for approximately nine and seven percent more respectively.
In addition to the observable unit characteristics, I control for neighborhood
e↵ects in column 1. Both the mean number of rooms and mean household size are
4Unfortunately, I am not able to observe whether the owner has utilized an owner move-in eviction
in their building.
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negative and statistically significant at one percent, consistent with the expected
sign. A fifty percent increase in the zone-level number of rooms (e.g. going from two
to three bedrooms) results in nearly a 28 percent increase in the response variable.
This likely reflects the scarcity of land and the housing supply constraints in the
area. It may also indicate that the area is becoming more suburban. The sign on
the coe cient of mean household income is positive. This indicates that increases in
income are associated with higher rents, suggesting a positive income elasticity. The
coe cient on the mean building age is positive, but insignificant.
The results from the estimation of the quality component from the baseline
model are presented in column 1 of Table 3.5. This model specification does not
include any interactions capturing the regulation change. The coe cient on the large
building term is negative, suggesting that lower quality is associated with buildings
with more than four units. This may be due to higher maintenance costs or other
di culties with maintaining a larger space. The coe cients on older and younger
are the expected signs and statistically significant at one percent. Older tenants are
associated with higher quality units which may due to greater disposable income.
By contrast, the coe cient on the younger term is negative suggesting that tenants
younger than 30 years are associated with overall lower housing quality.
Results from the full model estimation of the hedonic pricing model compo-
nent are presented in column 2 of Table 3.4. Most of the signs are as expected and
similar to those in the baseline estimation. The coe cient on rent control is negative
and statistically significant at ten percent, indicating that rent-controlled units have
lower annual contract rent compared to uncontrolled units. This is to be expected.
Moreover, increase in both house and neighborhood satisfaction measures are associ-
ated with higher annual rent, which is consistent with initial expectations. The signs
and magnitude of the coe cients for each of the neighborhood e↵ects terms are also
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similar to the baseline model in column 1.
In column 2 of Table 3.5 I present the results from the full model estimation
of the quality component including indicators for the post-regulation period, treat-
ment group, owner-occupied buildings, and their interactions. The coe cient on the
Treatment indicator provides a quality relation for controlled units in San Francisco
without a live-in building owner and prior to Proposition G and is negative and sta-
tistically significant at one percent. Notably, the coe cient on the rent-controlled
indicator variable is positive, suggesting rent controlled units in the San Francisco
MSA area are associated with higher overall housing quality. Since this indicator
only identifies whether a unit is rent-controlled, this is likely picking up higher qual-
ity rent-controlled units outside of the San Francisco city.
The marginal e↵ect of Treatment on housing quality in the post-regulation
period without an on-site owner is the sum of the coe cients on Treatment and
Treatment ⇥ Post, around  0.17. This result suggests that following Proposition G,
rent-controlled buildings in San Francisco are associated with lower housing quality,
relative to the surrounding MSA, prior to Proposition G. This is consistent with ini-
tial expectations and may provide evidence reflecting changes in landlord maintenance
and upkeep behavior. The main e↵ect concerns the impact of San Francisco controlled
buildings with a live-in building owner, following Proposition G. Controlling for dif-
ferences in whether the building owner lives on-site is important since it may explain
important di↵erences in quality. Moreover, several stipulations in the Proposition
G regulation specifically address the presence of an on-site owner. Compared with
the marginal e↵ect of Treatment prior to regulation with an on-site owner, quality
is also lower, around  0.1245. This is significant at ten percent and suggests that
even rent-controlled buildings with on-site owners are associated with lower housing
quality prior to the regulation change.
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In addition to examining the impact of the regulation change on housing qual-
ity, I also account for di↵erences in whether the building owner lives on-site. The
marginal e↵ect of Treatment on housing quality in the post-regulation period, with
an on-site owner, is the sum of the coe cients on Treatment, Treatment ⇥ Post,
Treatment ⇥ Owner, and Treatment ⇥ Post ⇥ Owner. This is approximately  0.28,
suggesting that following Proposition G, housing quality for the treatment group is
lower when the building owner lives on-site. It may be the case that the building
owner no longer believes that the property is worth maintaining for potential resale.
In addition to these findings, I present the distribution of housing quality in Figure
3.2. Similar to Galbraith (1998), the distribution shows a strong left skew.
3.6 Discussion & Conclusion
This paper examines the e↵ects of Proposition G on housing quality and tenant
filtering in San Francisco. San Francisco and surrounding cities initially implemented
rent control policies in an attempt to quell concerns from local residents over rising
rents. While San Francisco rent control policies were intended to ensure a stock of
adequate and a↵ordable rental housing, the actual e ciency gains are mixed, with
Early (2000) finding that tenants in controlled units would be better o↵ if the controls
had never been established. Landlords would also be better o↵ and have attempted to
circumvent the ordinance in several ways, one of which being through OMI evictions.
With rising OMI evictions and frequent use of condo conversions, San Francisco passed
Proposition G in an attempt to prevent landlords from abusing this no-fault eviction
and therefore maintain the stock of rental housing.
The results suggest that the impact of Proposition G on San Francisco housing
quality is negative and significant. In the hedonic component, attributes such as a
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balcony and working fireplace positively impact contract rent, consistent with theory.
Moreover, my findings for the quality component estimation confirm the filtering
hypothesis. Older tenants are associated with higher quality housing, while units with
a younger head of household occupy lower quality units. Following the regulation, the
results suggest that owner-occupied controlled buildings in San Francisco saw lower
quality.
Findings from Moorhouse (1972) suggest that in cases of rent control where an
entrepreneur anticipates a lower net revenue stream, it is optimal to adjust mainte-
nance to a lower level. He also notes that it is optimal to further adjust maintenance
levels given any unanticipated shocks, continuing until the controlled structure is de-
controlled. These results are consistent with my findings. Furthermore, Arnott and
Igarashi (2000) find that while most models assumption competitive rent control mar-
kets, this is overly simplistic. Using a monopolistically competitive model, he notes
that while mild rent control is beneficial, severe rent control policies do more harm
in terms of increasing ine ciencies regarding matching. These may have the impact
of restricting or slowing downward filtering in the market.
Proposition G was passed in 1998 in an attempt to stop landlords from exploit-
ing OMI evictions in an attempt to condo conversions in the city. Recent literature
has shown that rent control leads to tenants staying for longer durations as well as
causing rents to increase in the uncontrolled sector. The results from this paper
support the idea that rent control slows downward filtering and ultimately leads to
lower quality over time. These results highlight the need for alternative housing poli-
cies that support the goal of ensuring adequate and a↵ordable housing, without the
unintended e↵ects.
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Table 3.1: OMI Eviction Notices
Fiscal Year Notices
87 - 88 522
88 - 89 564
89 - 90 545
90 - 91 469
91 - 92 356
92 - 93 293
93 - 94 344
94 - 95 361
95 - 96 481
96 - 97 1,074
97 - 98 1,410
98 - 99 1,200
99 - 00 937
00 - 01 991
01 - 02 594
02 - 03 422
03 - 04 364
04 - 05 288
05 - 06 248
06 - 07 210
07 - 08 159
08 - 09 143
09 - 10 127
10 - 11 139
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Table 3.2: Description of Variables
Variable Name Description
Dependent Variable
rent Annual contract rent
Unit Characteristics
age Age of unit at time of survey
numrooms Number of rooms
numbaths Number of full bathrooms
numbeds Number of bedrooms
large Indicator if multiunit structure with more than four units
central heat Indicator if central heat
central ac Indicator if central ac
balcony Indicator if balcony/porch
fireplace Indicator if working fireplace
parking Indicator if parking included in rent
rentcontrol Indicator if unit is rent-controlled
ownerhere Indicator if the building owner resides in the building
housesatisfaction Self-reported measure of housing satisfaction (1-10 rating)
neighbsatisfaction Self-reported measure of neighborhood satisfaction (1-10 rating)
Household Characteristics
old Indicator if head of household 65 years or older
young Indicator if head of household 30 years or younger
black Black head of household
numper Number of persons in the household
male Male head of household
hhincome Total household income
married Married head of household
college College-educated head of household
Quality Components
insideleaks Indicator if leaks from inside home
brokenplaster Indicator if broken plaster inside unit
visiblecracks Indicator if visible cracks inside unit
sewbreakdown Indicator if sewage breakdown in last 90 days
adequate Housing adequacy index (ranging from adequate to severely inadequate)
Neighborhood E↵ects
avgrooms Zone-level average number of rooms
avgper Zone-level average household size
avgincome Zone-level average household income size
avgage Zone-level average structure age
Geography
MSA MSA the unit is located in
centralcity Indicator if unit located in the city of San Francisco
county County the unit is located in










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Selected Results from the Hedonic Component Estimation
Dependent Variable: — Renter Sample —
Log annual contract rent (1) Baseline (2) With interactions
Unit Characteristics
Building age  0.0967***  0.0978***
(0.0221) (0.0219)
Building age2 0.0104** 0.0106**
(0.0043) (0.0043)
Number rooms 0.3826*** 0.3904***
(0.0986) (0.0993)
Number rooms2  0.0369  0.0399
(0.0370) (0.0373)




Large multiunit 0.0038 0.0015
(0.0127) (0.0127)
Covered parking 0.0400*** 0.0401***
(0.0085) (0.0085)
Working fireplace 0.0908*** 0.0912***
(0.0101) (0.0101)
Balcony (porch) 0.0689*** 0.0691***
(0.0082) (0.0082)
Central heating 0.0179** 0.0176**
(0.0078) (0.0077)
House satisfaction 0.0294** 0.0298**
(0.0122) (0.0122)
Neighborhood satisfaction 0.0344*** 0.0327***
(0.0096) (0.0096)
Neighborhood E↵ects
Mean number rooms  0.5526***  0.5468***
(0.0847) (0.0847)
Mean household size  0.2334***  0.2382***
(0.0578) (0.0584)
Mean household income 0.4080*** 0.4075***
(0.0427) (0.0425)
Mean building age 0.0217 0.0178
(0.0303) (0.0301)
Location fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
Year fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
This table presents selected results from estimation of the stochastic frontier hedonic component in (3.1). Column 2
presents results for the hedonic component, controlling for interaction e↵ects in the quality component specification. The
sample consists of 5,097 observations from 1985 to 2011 and includes 5 counties in total. All model specifications include
year and location fixed e↵ects. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Selected Results from the Quality Component Estimation
Dependent Variable: — Renter Sample —
Mean housing quality (1) Baseline (2) With interactions
Unit & Tenant Attributes




Large multiunit  0.0826**  0.0860**
(0.0366) (0.0355)
Older tenant 0.2664*** 0.2641***
(0.0323) (0.0325)
Younger tenant  0.3396***  0.3428***
(0.0340) (0.0338)
Black tenant 0.1597*** 0.1604***
(0.0381) (0.0392)






Household income  0.1859***  0.1836***
(0.0119) (0.0119)
Maintenance Indicators
Adequacy rating 0.0523*** 0.0533**
(0.0428) (0.0241)
Inside leaks  0.0023  0.0067
(0.0294) (0.0290)
Outside leaks  0.0357  0.0337
(0.0319) (0.0325)









Treatment ⇥ post 0.1204**
(0.0614)
Owner-occupied ⇥ post 0.2352***
(0.0596)
Treatment ⇥ owner-occupied 0.1680***
(0.0629)
Treatment ⇥ owner-occupied ⇥ post  0.2815***
(0.0871)
Location fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
Year fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
This table presents selected results from estimation of the quality component in (3.4). The sample consists of 5,097
observations from 1985 to 2011 and includes 5 counties in total. All model specifications include year and location fixed
e↵ects. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Rent Frontier
110
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Housing Quality Estimates
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Appendix A Measure G (Proposition G)
PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS: Proposition G would change the owner move-in (OMI)
provisions of the rent control law. It would
1. limit landlord evictions to one per building;
2. allow evictions for relative move-ins only if the landlord lives in or is trying to
move into the same building;
3. require the landlord or relative to move in within 3 months and occupy the unit
for 36 continuous months for an eviction to be legal;
4. limit an OMI eviction if the landlord has a vacant comparable unit in the
building;
5. require a landlord to o↵er a tenant being evicted another available rental unit
at a rent comparable to the original rental unit;
6. provide that a domestic partner has rights as a “spouse”;
7. permanently ban the evictions of long-term senior, disabled and terminally ill
tenants.
Under current law an owner in good faith may evict a tenant from a unit that the
landlord or close relative will occupy. The tenant may not be evicted if there is a
comparable vacant unit in the same building. The landlord or relative must live in the
unit for twelve continuous months. If not, the eviction was not in good faith. Since
1983, San Francisco’s Condominium Conversion Law in e↵ect limits condominium
conversions to 200 a year. It also requires relocation for tenants and requires that
tenants be given first choice to buy units. However, by changing how deeds are held,
“tenancies-in-common” are exempt from condominium laws. Limiting owner move-ins
to one per building would eliminate the practice of using OMI evictions for tenancies-
in-common in which multiple owners own a building, each living in a separate unit.
Proposition G would amend Chapter 37 of the San Francisco Administrative Code,
The Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance (the Rent Control
Ordinance). Any part of Proposition G could be changed by a vote of the Board of
Supervisors without permission of the voters.
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